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Executive Summary 
 
 The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N) study team concludes that the U.S. 
national security apparatus requires significant reforms to meet the challenges of a new 
strategic era.  As part of its transformational efforts, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
must adapt not only to the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment but also must 
cope with many “hidden failures” that, while not preventing operational success, stifle 
necessary innovation and continue to squander critical resources in terms of time and 
money.  Many organizational structures and processes initially constructed to contain a 
Cold War superpower in the Industrial Age are inappropriate for 21st century missions in 
an Information Age. 
 
In taking a problem-centric approach to reform issues, the BG-N study team 
relied heavily on the experience of esteemed former practitioners for both identifying 
problems and justifying pragmatic recommendations.  It also looked beyond the scope of 
the original Goldwater-Nichols Act in addressing problems that significantly affect how 
DoD operates today, including the conduct of interagency and coalition operations as 
well as its relationship with Congress.  In making its recommendations, we believed it 
was essential to give organizations the capacity to carry out new mandates and not simply 
exhort a better performance from all relevant parties.  
 
In its approach to defense reform, the BG-N study team formulated a set of six 
guiding principles that would guide its search for recommendations to solve the most 
serious problems.  First, we recognize that preserving civilian control over the military is 
a paramount value in the American political system and is a prime responsibility of the 
Secretary of Defense (SecDef).  The President relies on the SecDef to assume ultimate 
authority over the affairs of the department.  Though the Defense Under Secretaries act as 
the principal means for exercising SecDef control of the military, the Service Secretaries 
continue to perform a meaningful role.  Second, we believe that the institutional vitality 
of the Military Services must be maintained.  In a real sense, the Military Services are the 
most enduring institutions in DoD and maintaining their health is a paramount concern.  
Third, while it is important to maintain the institutional vitality of the Military Services, 
jointness needs to be extended as a means to achieving superior military, interagency and 
coalition operations.   
 
Fourth, despite the “seams” and the elaborate processes that inevitably result, we 
base our recommendations on the premise that defense resources should continue to be 
organized, managed and budgeted along Service lines.  The Military Services remain the 
single best source for coherent and integrated budgets within their respective domains 
and are increasingly coordinating allocation structures to compensate for the inter-service 
“seams.”  Fifth, our recommendations attempt to conform to the basic organization 
formula that the Combatant Commanders (CoComs), Military Services and defense 
agencies are the operating elements of the Department of Defense.  The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, in large part, are the staffs that oversee these 
operations.  Our sixth and final guiding principle is to ensure a healthy competition of 
ideas on major issues among the CoComs, Military Services, the Joint Staff and OSD.  A 
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balance must be struck, however, between processes that ensure a diversity of views on 
the most critical issues, and processes that create too many competing power centers and 
unnecessary friction.   
 
We have taken a broad view of defense reform, as is necessary in the new 
strategic era.  No longer can defense reform be confined simply to the institutions and 
functions of the Department of Defense.  Rather, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols recognizes 
that for the United States to fully seize opportunities and confront dangers in the 21st 
century, both DoD and its partners in the U.S. government (USG) must adapt to new 
strategic circumstances.  It is in this collaborative spirit that we hope our 
recommendations will be received and acted on by the leadership.   
 
Rationalizing Organizational Structures in DoD 
 
 Too often, the current organizational structure of the Military Departments, the 
Joint Staff, and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) unnecessarily overlap, resulting 
in duplicative and, in some instances, overly large staffs that require wasteful 
coordination processes and impede necessary innovation.   
 
 Forcing a renewed focus on the core roles and responsibilities of each of DoD’s 
principal actors exposes those organizations whose contributions are outweighed by the 
inefficiencies in process and structure that they perpetuate.  A targeted consolidation of 
DoD organizational structures can thus preserve a diversity of ideas where it is warranted, 
and do so in a way that strengthens civilian oversight without undermining the value of 
independent military advice on matters of great interest to U.S. policymakers.   
 
 We therefore recommend the merging of most of each Service Secretariat into a 
single, smaller integrated staff that reports to both the Service Secretary and the Chief of 
Staff.  A more integrated civilian and military staff would reduce friction-generating 
coordination mechanisms, increase the coherency of Service positions, and provide 
clearer lines of accountability.  As the responsibility for civilian oversight of the military 
has increasingly shifted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the nature of the 
Service Secretary’s job has evolved from a staff function to a “line” function.  The 
Service Secretary no longer needs a large, separate secretariat and would be better served 
by a more integrated team. 
 
 The Joint Staff enables the Chairman to provide oversight of the Combatant 
Commands and the Military Departments and fulfill his role as the principal military 
advisor to the National Command Authority.1  OSD is the apparatus that provides 
managerial oversight and independent analysis to the Secretary of Defense on issues he 
deems critical.  In line with those key roles and responsibilities, we recommend the 
integration of military and civilian staffs with respect to managerial functions and 
                                                 
1 This report uses the masculine pronoun for the major DoD institutional actors purely for convenience, not 
as an expression of support for current practice.  The BG-N study team believes that opportunities for 
women in DoD should be expanded and expects that more women will be appointed or promoted to the 
most senior levels as part of that process.  
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retaining as separate organizations those Joint Staff directorates that are most directly 
within the Chairman’s military purview.  For the personnel and logistics function, we 
recommend, therefore, that J-1 (Manpower and Personnel) and J-4 (Logistics) be merged 
into integrated civilian and military offices under a military deputy who reports directly 
to its respective Under Secretary.  J-7 (Operational Plans and Joint Force Development), 
whose responsibilities have migrated steadily to the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 
should be disbanded.  J-7’s planning function should go to J-5 (Strategic Plans & Policy). 
 
Joint Procurement of Command and Control (C2) 
   
 The armed forces are increasingly waging joint and interdependent combat 
operations. Yet, as seen in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, DoD is still 
failing to acquire and field joint interoperable command and control capabilities.  
Therefore, we recommend that J-6 (Command, Control, Communications and Computers 
or C4) be converted into the core of a department-wide, joint task force (with budgetary 
and acquisition authority) for Joint C2.  This military task force would be commanded by 
a 3-star (the former J-6) and augmented by appropriate elements of the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) as determined by the Secretary of Defense upon the 
recommendation of CJCS.   A new Under Secretary of Defense for C3I, which would be 
created by elevating the C3 function to the Under Secretary level and combining it with 
Intelligence, would provide oversight of the new JTF for C2.  We support the recent 
elevation of the intelligence function to the Under Secretary level, but believe that 
leaving C3 at the Assistant Secretary level understates the importance of the C3 function 
in modern warfare. 
 
 We further recommend that OSD renew its focus on policy formation and 
oversight, resist the temptation to manage programs and consolidate DoD housekeeping 
functions under an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.      
 
Toward a More Effective Resource Allocation Process 
   
 The Department of Defense’s resource allocation process often stifles innovation 
by making it extremely difficult for defense leaders to make important trade-off decisions 
across mission areas.  Strategic planning, essential in a world of finite resources and 
shifting priorities, is poorly connected to program decisions and budgeting.  And though 
the Department is adept at allocating resources for its programs, it pays inadequate 
attention to program execution and policy implementation.  
  
The BG-N study team salutes the substantial effort Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
and his team have made to strengthen strategic direction and the building of joint 
capabilities in the resource allocation process.  The changes made during 2003 have 
considerable promise, but more, we believe, is necessary for them to be fully 
implemented.  As a consequence, we recommend building capacities in the Combatant 
Commands for a stronger role in the resource allocation process.   
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We further recommend building a strong Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (PA&E) capable of providing independent analysis to the Secretary on broad 
strategic choices facing DoD, as a necessary hedge against those occasions when there is 
too little jointness in the options generated by the Military Services and the Joint Staff. 
 
Finally, the Secretary of Defense should create an independent, continuous policy 
implementation/execution review process under a new office within OSD.  This office 
also would be responsible for gathering all authoritative and directive guidance to 
establish a single, unified statement of the strategies, policies and programs to be 
followed, implemented and executed.  This would provide a clear standard to which all 
DoD components could be held accountable. 
 
Strengthening Civilian Professionals in Defense and National Security 
  
 Civilian professionals in the Defense Department, and the national security 
agencies more broadly are losing the ability to provide strategic guidance and policy 
oversight.  DoD, in particular, must confront a looming crisis in its ability to attract and 
retain top-level talent to the career civil service.  While the passage of the new National 
Security Personnel System legislation gives the Secretary of Defense significantly 
broadened latitude to reshape the future of DoD’s civilian workforce, substantial 
additional steps are needed to attract, retain, motivate and reward a quality and high-
performing corps of defense professionals. 
 
 We recommend therefore that Congress establish a new Defense Professionals 
Corps to attract the best and brightest civilians to serve in DoD and to provide greatly 
expanded opportunities for professional development and career advancement.  Training, 
education, and required interagency rotations for senior-level career appointments should 
become centerpieces of the new personnel system. 
 
 We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense should create a “personnel 
float” over the next five years of about a 1000 career civilian billets (GS-12 through SES) 
in OSD and defense agencies to enable education, training and rotations.  Congress 
should also reassess overly restrictive ethics rules to enable defense professionals to more 
easily move in and out of government service over the course of their careers and limit 
the number of political appointees to enhance the incentives associated with career 
service.  
  
Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations 
 
 Complex U.S. contingency operations over the past decade, from Somalia to Iraq, 
have demonstrated the necessity for a unity of effort not only from the armed forces but 
also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition.  In most cases, 
however, such unity of effort has proved elusive, sometimes with disastrous results.  The 
U.S. national security apparatus requires significant new investments in this area.  
Otherwise, the United States’ ability to conduct successful political-military contingency 
operations will continue to be fundamentally impaired.   
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 A critical first step is for the President to give greater organizational emphasis to 
this issue by designating the Deputy Assistant to the President on the NSC staff as having 
lead responsibility for integrating agency strategies and plans and ensuring greater unity 
of effort among agencies during execution, and by establishing a new office in the 
National Security Council with this mandate.  Each President, early in his tenure, should 
review the guidance establishing standard operating procedures for the planning of 
complex operations.   
 
 We further recommend that the Secretaries of all agencies likely to be involved in 
complex operations abroad (e.g., State, Treasury, Commerce and Justice) set up small, 
proprietary planning offices to lead the development of agency plans and participate in 
the interagency planning process.  For each contingency operation, the president should 
designate one senior official to be in charge of and accountable for integrating U.S. 
interagency operations on the ground once major combat operations have ceased. 
 
 Congress has a significant part to play in developing the U.S. government’s 
capacity for conducting successful interagency and coalition operations.  It should 
establish a new Agency for Stability Operations, with a Civilian Stability Operations 
Corps and Reserve charged with: assessing and preparing for stability operations; 
organizing, training and equipping civilian capabilities for such operations; and rapidly 
deploying civilian experts and teams to the field. To facilitate this overall effort, we 
further recommend the establishment of a new Training Center for Interagency and 
Coalition Operations, to be jointly run by DoD’s National Defense University and the 
State Department’s National Foreign Affairs Training Center.   
 
Finally, Congress must devote increased funds for programs that enhance 
peacetime opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with their 
counterparts from various countries.  It should also increase U.S. funding for programs 
that support building the operational capabilities of allies and partners in priority task 
areas in complex operations.   
 
Strengthening Congressional Oversight 
 
Congressional oversight of the defense establishment, critically important to the 
nation’s ability to identify and defeat extant and emerging threats to our security and that 
of our friends and allies across the globe, is languishing.  Congress is engaged in too 
much of the wrong kind of oversight – too few national debates on major issues and far 
too much time and energy spent on relatively minor and parochial issues.  The decline in 
Congressional oversight has clearly contributed to deteriorating relations between 
Congress and DoD.  
 
To create the conditions for reinvigorating Congressional oversight of the Defense 
Department, we recommend that Congress establish a process similar to the one created 
for the base realignment and closure (BRAC).  Congress could establish an independent 
group -- perhaps made up of former Congressional leaders from both Houses and both 
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parties -- to assess current committee membership, structures and jurisdictions and to 
make recommendations on how to enhance Congressional oversight.  While the BG-N 
study team believes that the Armed Services committees should be encouraged to elevate 
their focus on strategic and policy issues and should be reduced in size, only Congress 
can decide how to reform itself.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In the mid-1980s, a series of operational military failures in the field – the 
botched attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran, the Beirut embassy bombing 
and the interoperability problems during the invasion of Grenada – convinced Congress 
that the Department of Defense was broken and that something had to be done.  Despite 
intense resistance from DoD, over four years of Congressional hearings, investigation, 
and analysis finally culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols)-- a landmark of U.S. defense reform.   
 
Today, the context is very different.  Unlike the 1980s, today’s DoD failures are 
“hidden” and largely unknown to the broader public.  After all, the United States now 
fields by far the world’s finest military, which has achieved one stunning operational 
success after another.  No institution capable of performing its core function that well can 
be said to be broken.   
  
But while the U.S. military is extremely good at conducting military operations, it 
does so very inefficiently.  The current DoD budget costs more than a billion dollars per 
day and that does not even include the costs of maintaining our forces in extended 
operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  Given the future fiscal pressures likely on the 
defense budget, and the demands of an era of rapid, continuous change, DoD needs to do 
as good a job preparing for military operations as it does in conducting them. 
 
The process that led to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols was laborious and often 
contentious.2  External studies and expert groups were central to creating the momentum 
and consensus for tackling necessary reforms.  The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) played a critical role in building the analytic and political foundation for 
Congressional action – in particular, through its path-breaking report, Toward a More 
Effective Defense.3  CSIS also convened a Blue Ribbon commission to help promote the 
importance of military reform.     
 
More than twenty years later, and with the active engagement of a new generation 
of former civilian and military practitioners, expert commentators, and accomplished 
academics, CSIS again is seeking to promote defense reform -- but in a very different 
political context.  Goldwater-Nichols emerged from an intense struggle between the 
legislative and executive branch.  Today, defense reform will occur only if the two 
branches can agree that a set of proposals makes good sense and work collaboratively to 
achieve them.  With its bipartisan character and breadth of experience, CSIS believes it 
can help forge that consensus.   
 
                                                 
2 See Jim Locher’s excellent chronicle, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the 
Pentagon, College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press (2002). 
3 CSIS Defense Organization Project (Principal Authors: Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn), 
Toward a More Effect Defense: The Final Report of the Defense Organization Project, Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University (1985). 
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Drawing upon the vast collective experience of current and former civilian and 
military officials, the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N) study team has sought to 
identify specific problems and then to develop practical, actionable measures for fixing 
them. 
 
Our report began with an executive summary and then, following this 
introduction, includes a brief primer on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and a scorecard 
for the principal objectives of Goldwater-Nichols, along with an assessment of 
unintended consequences from the legislation.  Chapter Three describes the assumptions 
and principles that guided CSIS’s approach to defense reform.  Chapters Four through 
Nine identify problems currently facing DoD and propose actions for addressing them.   
Chapter Ten summarizes the BG-N major recommendations of Phase 1 according to the 
types of actions required, whether by legislative or executive action.  The final chapter 
identifies the critical issues to be addressed in the second and last phase of the project, 
scheduled to run from April 2004 through March 2005.   
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Chapter 2 
A Goldwater-Nichols Scorecard 
 
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
stands as one of the most important military reforms in U.S. history.  As we consider 
ways in which the current defense establishment should be adapted and updated for 21st-
century security challenges, it is vital first to appreciate the legacy and long-term impact 
of Goldwater-Nichols on the way the U.S. military works.  
 
Goldwater-Nichols: A Primer 
 
Goldwater-Nichols stands as the most comprehensive defense reorganization 
package enacted since the National Security Act in 1947.  Intended to accelerate jointness 
within the U.S. armed forces by fundamentally redesigning the manner in which they 
were organized, trained, commanded and employed, Goldwater-Nichols affected virtually 
all major elements of DoD.  Today, many consider Goldwater-Nichols and its subsequent 
implementation as instrumental in the overwhelming successes of U.S. forces in Panama, 
the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo, and most recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The 
prestige the U.S. military establishment currently enjoys stands in sharp contrast with its 
reputation prior to the act’s passage in October 1986.   
 
Starting with America’s involvement in Vietnam and culminating with the Iran 
hostage rescue attempt and the Beirut bombing, the U.S. military endured a long period 
of criticism.  Even the 1983 Grenada intervention, where the United States won, caused 
serious concern over the lack of progress in executing joint operations.  The experiences 
of that period shaped a widespread Congressional consensus that DoD required a major 
overhaul.  The resulting landmark legislation was the offspring of a number of years of 
intensive debate, study, hearings and reports conducted by Congressional staffs, the 
Defense Department, the White House, and throughout the defense establishment.4  
Generally considered a compromise between the more radical approach initially taken by 
some in Congress and the more moderate slate of recommendations that came out of 
Executive Branch deliberations, the act’s principal sponsors—Senator Barry Goldwater 
and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and Representative Bill 
Nichols and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin —were able to build 
exceptionally strong bipartisan support for the reform agenda. 
   
Congress believed that implementation of the act would promote more unified 
direction and action of the U.S. armed forces by promoting jointness at the expense of the 
authorities of the Military Services.  Notwithstanding the sweeping scope of the 
legislation, the framers’ intent underlying the act remains readily discernible.  Congress 
sought to strengthen civilian authority within the Department, improve military advice to 
civilian leadership, clarify the authority and responsibilities of the Combatant 
                                                 
4 Some military experts trace the intellectual evolution of Goldwater-Nichols to an influential article 
entitled “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” written by CJCS, General David Jones, USAF.  The 
so-called Jones plan was moderate in comparison to the wide-ranging scope of Goldwater-Nichols yet 
significant in that he was still serving as Chairman at the time. 
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Commanders (CoComs, formerly known as “CINCS”), improve strategy formulation and 
contingency planning, provide for more efficient use of defense resources, and enhance 
the professionalism and personnel management of the joint officer.5  Assessments of the 
extent to which the act has been implemented, its impact on DoD and the nation’s 
security more broadly, commenced soon after the act’s passage and continue to the 
present day.   
 
This “scorecard” reviews three categories of issues: (1) the extent to which the 
objectives explicitly laid out in Goldwater-Nichols have been achieved; (2) the 
unintended consequences of the legislation; and (3) important defense issues that have 
arisen since 1986 that the authors of Goldwater-Nichols did not anticipate. 
 
Goldwater-Nichols: An Assessment 
 
The first explicit objective of Goldwater-Nichols was to strengthen civilian 
authority.  The legislation clearly enhanced the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef or 
Secretary) overall control over the Defense Department.  The report accompanying 
Goldwater-Nichols stated, “The Secretary of Defense has sole and ultimate power within 
the Department of Defense on any matter on which the secretary chooses to act.”  In 
particular, the legislation substantially increased the Secretary’s authority to provide DoD 
components with guidance on programs.  Critics of Goldwater-Nichols argued, 
particularly during the 1990s, that the new powers and responsibilities of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS or Chairman) had excessively weakened the Secretary’s 
authority.  Since Donald H. Rumsfeld became the Secretary of Defense in 2001 though, 
there has been little doubt about who is in charge in DoD.  Many, however, including the 
current Secretary himself, express frustration about how hard it is for the SecDef to 
change fundamentally how DoD functions. 
 
The legislation’s second objective was to improve military advice.  Widespread 
agreement exists that the quality of military advice improved after Goldwater-Nichols 
made the CJCS head of an expanded Joint Staff and clearly designated him as “the 
principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the 
Secretary of Defense,” with the other Service Chiefs relegated to roles “as advisors.”  In 
addition, the legislation’s assignment to the CJCS of responsibility for developing joint 
doctrine has led to the creation and regular updating of a comprehensive body of joint 
publications.   
 
On the negative side, the Chairman has rarely used his powers to alter roles and 
missions.  Moreover, the President and his senior civilian advisors receive military advice 
from both the Combatant Commanders and the Chairman, but the quality of the latter 
might not be as valuable if the Chairman believes his role should be limited to supporting 
the CoComs’ positions.  Finally, Goldwater-Nichols did not envision that the President 
and the Secretary of Defense would no longer seek military advice from the Service 
                                                 
5 Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces:  Implementing the 1986 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act, Carlisle, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, August 6, 1996, p. v.  
These objectives are actually itemized in Act itself. 
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Chiefs, although that has been the predominant practice.  There is a case to be made for a 
diversity of views on military matters at a time when military experience and knowledge 
has become an increasingly rare commodity among senior public servants in the White 
House, Congress and elsewhere. 
 
The third explicit objective of Goldwater-Nichols was to ensure that the 
Combatant Commanders had authorities commensurate with their responsibilities.  The 
new authorities and discretions granted the CoComs in the arena of warfighting were 
among the most far-reaching innovations in the legislation.  In theory, a CoCom is now 
directly responsible for implementing and directing a campaign plan, with little 
interference from military or civilian supervisors back in Washington.  In practice, 
however, CoComs frequently have been asked to submit their proposed campaign plans 
for sometimes-rigorous scrutiny by their superiors.  The balance here is probably right, 
with appropriate discretion and oversight to achieve the desired results.  With the possible 
exception of Kosovo, there has been little civilian micromanagement on the order of 
President Johnson’s practice of poring over bombing targets in the White House 
basement during the Vietnam War. 
 
The fourth objective of the legislation was to increase attention to strategy 
formulation and contingency planning.  Traditionally, the Service Staffs were principally 
involved in crafting operational plans.  Now much of that responsibility has shifted under 
Goldwater-Nichols to the Chairman, the Joint Staff, the Under Secretary for Policy, and 
the CoComs.  These new institutional arrangements have proven much superior to the 
prior system.  In the area of grand strategy as opposed to contingency planning, however, 
the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy documents that have 
been produced since 1986 have offered general descriptions of administration foreign and 
defense policies, but neither document has established the clear priorities required to 
make trade-offs among competing resource demands.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
Defense Planning Guidance also failed to establish priorities and will be replaced by two 
documents, the Strategic Planning Guidance and the Joint Programming Guidance, which 
have still to be published (at the time this report was prepared). 
 
Goldwater-Nichols’ fifth explicit objective was to achieve a more efficient use of 
defense resources.  The legislation has enhanced the CJCS’s role in assessing the 
programs and budgets of the Military Services and other DoD components.  The 
Department also has become more attentive to the need to promote a joint perspective in 
the requirements and acquisition processes.  The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (VCJCS or Vice Chairman) has assumed a prominent role in promoting jointness in 
requirements by means of the enhanced role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) and the introduction of the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) 
process.  But the 1986 act has not provided the necessary recipe or incentives for reform 
of the plans and programming functions.  The JROC has operated far below its potential, 
with narrow Service parochial interests often continuing to be decisive over joint 
perspectives when it comes to setting procurement and requirement priorities.  And the 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) continues to suffer from a variety 
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of problems.  Secretary Rumsfeld has made significant efforts to improve the resource 
allocation process, which will be assessed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
 
The legislation’s sixth objective was to improve the management of joint officers.   
By creating a Joint Staff Officer (JSO) designation along with specific reforms for 
improving the professional military education system, the 1986 act created an entirely 
new set of incentives and requirements for military advancement.  These steps taken 
together served to advance “jointness” as an operating concept and a means for 
institutional evaluation in important and innovative ways.  But the JSO requirements and 
assignments continue to have an arbitrary dimension in several organizations.  An 
intensive review of how billets have been selected for the all-important joint requirement, 
therefore, seems warranted. 
 
The seventh objective of Goldwater-Nichols was to enhance the effectiveness of 
military operations.  The objective record here appears to be decisive.  Overwhelming 
successful military campaigns in Panama, the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq have provided critical tests of the quality of military advice and 
operations under the system that Goldwater-Nichols established.  While defense reform 
coincided with the introduction of revolutionary and potentially decisive military 
capabilities into the armed forces – precision-guided munitions, dominant battlefield 
awareness, and the direct application of special forces in larger military campaigns – it is 
undoubtedly the case that the delineation and streamlining of the chain of command from 
Washington to the theater have also contributed to victory on the battlefield.   
 
The legislation’s final explicit objective was to improve the management and 
administration of the Department of Defense.  Goldwater-Nichols did create mechanisms 
to supervise better the increasingly important defense agencies.  It also reduced the 
number of officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who reported directly to the 
SecDef.  But OSD is still too involved in managing programs rather than developing and 
overseeing policy.  In addition, while Goldwater-Nichols specified the Service 
Secretaries’ responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense (and stressed the SecDef’s 
authority over them), it did not adequately clarify their relationships to the Service Chiefs 
or the roles of their civilian staffs. 
 
Unintended Consequences and Unforeseen Challenges 
 
On the whole, the unintended consequences of Goldwater-Nichols have been 
surprisingly minor given the legislation’s sweeping nature.  It is probably the case that 
the act tipped the balance of power of respective Pentagon staffs away from the Services 
and OSD toward the joint arena.  Some also argue that the current equilibrium between 
civilian and military staffs is fundamentally out of balance.  In addition, many observers 
have expressed concerns that the Services have lost too much power to the CJCS, OSD, 
the CoComs, and other DoD components.  Finally, the enhanced CoCom role in U.S. 
regional security policy has highlighted weaknesses in their civilian counterparts, 
especially in terms of resources. 
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More serious than the legislation’s unintended consequences have been issues that 
have arisen since 1986 that the authors of Goldwater-Nichols, like most everyone else, 
did not, and in some cases could not, anticipate.  Foremost has been the fundamental 
change in the nature of the security environment.  At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, the 
United States was engaged in a very dangerous, but somewhat predictable, competition 
with the Soviet Union.  Today, the United States, albeit the world’s sole superpower, is 
waging a global war on terrorism and must cope with pervasive uncertainty.  A Defense 
Department designed for a massive, industrial-era opponent is clearly not suited for 
combating covert, non-state actors in the Information Age.   
 
Another unanticipated issue has been the weakness of the interagency process.  
Problems in this dimension became apparent in the complex contingency operations 
during the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia.  They persist today in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Goldwater-Nichols also did not address the organization and role 
of the National Security Council (NSC).  The NSC needs to play a greater role in 
coordinating policy planning and overseeing policy execution during America’s 
involvement in regional crises.  The weaknesses of other U.S. federal government 
agencies have forced DoD to bear the main burden of nation-building.  To redress this 
situation, civilian capacities for conducting complex contingency operations clearly need 
to be enhanced. 
 
The importance of coalition operations involving the United States and other 
countries has increased since 1986 in ways few could have anticipated.  The post-Cold 
War era has seen numerous “coalitions of the willing” employing ad hoc mechanisms for 
cooperation.  We clearly need more effective mechanisms to coordinate planning and 
operations among coalition partners.  Information sharing among allies also remains a 
problem. 
 
Finally, the increased importance of certain missions since the end of the Cold 
War, and especially since the events of September 11, 2001, has raised the issue of how 
DoD should organize to deal with them.  These missions include homeland defense, 
counterterrorism, WMD defense and consequence management, and post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
 
Why Reform Is Needed Today  
 
It may seem contradictory or counterintuitive to be arguing the case for new 
defense reforms in the face of the dramatic evidence of recent American military 
prowess.  Unlike the military mishaps in Iran, Grenada, and Beirut that animated the need 
for change before the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, the recent record of U.S. military 
accomplishments is a testament to unsurpassed martial prowess and technological 
superiority.  The invasion of Panama, the first Gulf War, skirmishes in Bosnia, the air 
campaign against Kosovo, the Afghanistan war, and the invasion of Iraq – while each 
could be assigned some tactical imperfection or military oversight – collectively provide 
a picture of armed dominance that would be difficult to improve.  These military victories 
provide the common public understanding of a defense establishment without peer and 
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not in need of profound changes.  Yet a closer examination reveals some systemic 
shortcomings that need fixing. 
 
Over the past decade, the United States has been actively engaged in several post-
conflict reconstruction situations — in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan, 
and now Iraq – with only limited degrees of success.  Iraq is already the most challenging 
of the post-Cold War post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and the experience to date 
reveals that the Defense Department and the U.S. government are ill-prepared and poorly 
equipped to deal with urgent requirements of nation building.  There is no doubt 
ambivalence, particularly in Pentagon, to prepare for missions deemed by many to be 
inappropriate, but the sheer repetition of these operations in recent years suggests both a 
continuing need and an insufficient capability both in the military and in the larger 
interagency context. 
 
There are also new military and national security missions that have taken on a 
new urgency since 9/11 and impose new requirements on DoD.  These potential missions 
range from coordinating the activities of the National Guard and elements of the reserves 
in various homeland security functions such as consequence management activities to 
providing air defense support during hijackings.  The war on terror has blurred many of 
the distinctions in international security, such as the borders (legal and otherwise) that 
separate home and abroad, domestic and international.  The Defense Department and the 
many organizations that comprise the national security bureaucracy are still configured 
primarily for Cold War era operations rather than for some of the growing threats to our 
national security coming from transnational terrorist groups and others.  Preparing for 
these urgent challenges will require institutional innovations, the creation of new 
capabilities, and greater coordination throughout the government.    
 
Outdated organizational structures also remain a problem.  One of the continuing 
criticisms of the modern American military establishment is the continuing imbalances in 
the tooth-to-tail ratio, with redundancies and unnecessary bureaucracy often claiming 
resources that could be better employed at the operational end of the organization.  These 
duplicative procedures and often overly large headquarter staffs have created a wasteful 
bureaucracy that is bogged down in protracted coordination processes. In the Executive 
branch, this has led to too little strategic thinking -- and instilled an excessive attention to 
details, and sometimes unimportant ones at that. 
 
Even while the defense budget has grown considerably in recent years, there is a 
growing awareness of the need to rationalize resources because fiscal realities will 
arguably limit future defense allocations.  The Pentagon’s inefficient resource allocation 
process has reinforced inertia, incrementalism and parochialism in the distribution of 
defense related funds.  These inefficiencies are extraordinarily wasteful.  They stifle 
innovation in the deployment of resources for both legacy and transformational systems 
crucial for the nation’s national security. 
 
Compounding the problems of inefficiency and waste in the resource allocation 
process is the continuing dominance of the Services in the procurement process.  Under 
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the current system, narrow Service interests frequently prevail over joint perspectives and 
solutions.  The fact of too little jointness in the acquisition determinations ultimately is a 
liability in terms of providing the Combatant Commanders with the necessary capabilities 
to prosecute modern warfare.  While the passage of Goldwater-Nichols has significantly 
advanced joint perspectives in the policy arena, jointness in the procurement and defense 
allocation process has lagged substantially and is one of the few unrecognized 
dimensions of the 1986 legislation.  A new round of reforms must aim to close the 
jointness gap between the policy and operational realms and the overall procurement 
world. 
 
One of the many benefits of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms was the creation of a 
strong incentive structure for the Military Services to send their best and the brightest 
officers to serve in joint billets.  The ability of the Joint Staff to consistently attract the 
finest officers has made it one of the most influential organizations in Washington.  At 
the same time, the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense has atrophied 
correspondingly.  There is currently too little civilian expertise in the U.S. government 
generally and the Department of Defense specifically.  This has led to a serious 
imbalance between military and civilian expertise at the Pentagon, with the consequence 
being that civilian advice often can not currently compete with that offered by their 
counterparts on the Joint Staff. 
 
Finally, truly maximizing the full potential of our national security infrastructure 
requires a deeper communication and partnership between the Executive branch and 
Congress.  This relationship has frayed during the last several years as Congress has 
largely abrogated its critical oversight role.  Trust has been weakened between the two 
branches of government and must be restored in order to achieve a greater partnership to 
tackle the nation’s defense and security interests. 
 
These problems all impede the full potential of the U.S. government to fulfill its 
national security responsibilities.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In the final assessment, American military successes since 1986 do not resolve all 
questions about Goldwater-Nichols’ effectiveness.  In several important areas, the jury is 
still out.  In addition, just as yesterday’s military failures illuminated shortcomings in 
organization, training, and leadership, today’s military successes can obscure underlying 
shortcomings or festering concerns.  We do our military and our country a disservice if 
we leave such shortcomings unaddressed. 
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Chapter 3 
The CSIS Approach to Defense Reform 
 
Whereas the Defense Department looks much as it did soon after Goldwater-
Nichols was implemented, the security environment in which DoD operates has changed 
dramatically.  The Cold War is over and the Soviet Union is gone.  In the wake of 9/11, 
the United States protects a vulnerable homeland and is engaged in a protracted global 
war on terrorism.  DoD still fights the nation’s wars, but the nature of warfare is 
changing.  Twenty-first century wars are not just military operations, but increasingly 
demand the use and integration of all the instruments of national power – diplomacy, 
intelligence, law enforcement, economic and military.   
 
Not only does the Defense Department need to adapt to a rapidly changing 
security environment, it must cope with many “hidden failures” that, while not preventing 
operational success per se, impede necessary change and continue to produce waste and 
inefficiency in terms of time and money.  Increasingly stressed by the pace of current 
operations, the U.S. military must transform itself to deal with asymmetric challenges and 
new missions.  Organizational structures and processes initially constructed to contain the 
Soviet Union are inappropriate for 21st century missions. 
 
Operating Assumptions   
 
• In taking a problem-centric approach to reform issues, the BG-N study team 
relied heavily on experience for both identifying problems and justifying 
recommendations.  It also looked beyond the scope of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act in addressing problems that significantly affect how DoD operates today.  
In making its recommendations, the BG-N study team believed it was essential 
to give organizations the capacity to carry out new mandates.  
 
The Department of Defense must cope with conflicting imperatives – adapting to 
a rapidly changing security environment while preserving the capability to field a military 
unparalleled in history.  Acutely aware of the risks associated with making changes to 
organizational structures and processes, the BG-N study team took a problem-centric 
approach to defense reform.  We would only recommend organizational or process 
changes if the problems were significant enough to warrant the risks of unintended 
consequences.  The common-sense axiom – “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” – was the 
operating assumption.   
 
For example, Goldwater-Nichols sought improved military effectiveness through 
greater jointness in the planning and conduct of military operations.  Although one can 
identify insufficient jointness in how the U.S. military has planned (e.g., Operation 
Anaconda in Operation Enduring Freedom) or organized (e.g., no joint billets below the 
four-star Joint Force Commander), the end-result was still superior military operations, 
and, therefore, an insufficient case for defense reform.  On the other hand, the unity of 
effort that Goldwater-Nichols brought to the planning and conduct of military operations 
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has not characterized U.S. interagency operations.  Here, as illustrated most recently in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the problem is severe enough to warrant accepting the risks 
associated with organizational change.   
 
In addition, the CSIS approach was heavily grounded in experience.  Its 
evidentiary basis is the personal experiences of its interviewees, case studies and real-life 
lessons learned.  In making decisions about recommended solutions, the single most 
important factor was the judgment of a wide and diverse body of experienced former 
practitioners.  During Phase 1 of Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, more than 120 former 
officials participated in the five working groups that analyzed problems and developed 
recommended solutions.  (See Appendix 1 for the list of BG-N working group 
participants).  Draft Phase 1 results were also vetted in three “murder board” sessions of 
former senior government leaders who had not been previously involved in BG-N.  (See 
Appendix 2 for the list of participants).  We did not arrive at our recommended actions 
deductively from some ideal organizational end-state, but derived them inductively from 
the collective experience of BG-N participants.6  We developed experience-based 
responses to clearly identified problems. 
 
  Although initially focused solely on defense reform, the BG-N study team soon 
looked beyond the scope of Goldwater-Nichols as they addressed national security issues 
that concern the entire United States government (USG), not just DoD.  As we now see in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq, success in “major combat operations” must be followed by 
success in post-conflict “stability operations.” In many instances, DoD’s success hinges 
on how well it integrates with other USG agencies and coalition partners.  In the scoping 
effort that preceded the Phase 1 study effort, the BG-N study team identified the lack of 
unity in strategy development, planning and the conduct of interagency operations and 
the increasingly difficult relationship between Congress and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense as two of DoD’s most vexing problems.  Thus, it gave the study its title, Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols, rather than “Goldwater-Nichols Revisited” or “Goldwater-Nichols 
II.” 
 
The final operating assumption for BG-N is the necessity of building capacity to 
ensure that any individual or organization given new roles or responsibilities has the 
ability to execute them.  Recommending that an organization, with its current structure 
and capacities, take on expanded responsibilities in a new process is an empty mandate.  
One member of the BG-N study group was fond of repeating the direction of the Oxford 
coxswain as his team was falling behind the Cambridge boat – “Row better, Oxford.”  
Telling an existing organization to “Do better” or “Act differently” without providing it 
capacities consistent with its new responsibilities is unlikely to produce results.     
 
                                                 
6 CSIS takes sole responsibility for the analysis and recommendations contained in this report.  We sought 
feedback, but not consent, from the BG-N participants.  It is quite likely that no external BG-N participant 
agrees with every CSIS recommendation.  It is also possible that some BG-N participants agree with none 
of them. 
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Guiding Principles 
 
In its approach to defense reform, the BG-N study team formulated a set of 
principles that would guide its search for recommendations to solve the most serious 
problems.   
 
• Preserving civilian control over the military is a paramount value in the 
American political system and is a prime responsibility of the Secretary of 
Defense. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the Department of Defense, the Service Secretaries 
helped the President to maintain civilian control.  The President now relies on the 
Secretary of Defense, who has absolute authority, subject to the consent of the President, 
over the Department of Defense.  Over time, the Secretary has turned increasingly to his 
Under Secretaries as the principal means for exercising his control of the military.  The 
Service Secretaries, however, continue to provide the Secretary of Defense with 
potentially useful means of providing direction to the department.   
 
• The institutional vitality of the Military Services must be maintained.   
 
The Military Services build and sustain the profession of arms – that is, the body 
of expert knowledge and the men and women trained in the application of that knowledge 
to new circumstances – in their respective mediums of warfare.  The identity of the 
Military Services also is critical to motivating young men and women to withstand the 
rigors of combat.  As retired Major General Tom Wilkerson, of the Marine Corps, often 
stated, “I didn’t sign up to be a ‘DoD-er.’  I wanted to be a Marine.”  As force providers 
to the Combatant Commands, the Military Services are responsible for providing 
coherent budgets that balance the near-term demand of current operations with the need 
to invest in future capabilities.  The Military Services are the most enduring institutions 
in DoD and maintaining their health is a paramount concern. 
 
• At the same time, it is increasingly apparent that “jointness” can improve unity 
of effort and performance at many levels, including the interagency.   
 
Jointness is not an end in itself, but a means to an end such as superior military 
and interagency operations.  The increasingly seamless use of forces in the field, 
however, makes it more difficult to cope with the lack of integration in how the Military 
Services equip their forces.  For example, as seen most recently in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), interoperability problems continue to plague tactical communications 
and contribute to friendly fire casualties.  Thus, while it is important to maintain the 
institutional vitality of the Military Service, some functions, such as special forces and 
missile defense, have already been addressed in an integrated, department-wide manner 
and others may need to be as well. It is also critical to extend our notions of “jointness” to 
the interagency and coalition levels.  
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• Resources should still be organized, managed and budgeted along Service lines. 
 
Goldwater-Nichols has helped enable the separate Military Services to overcome 
their “seams” and fight as a joint team.  This success in bringing greater jointness to the 
conduct of military operations has led some to advocate greater jointness in how DoD 
organizes and prepares for warfare.  The BG-N study team gave serious consideration to 
less Service-centric approaches to managing resources, including the British Defense 
Ministry’s reliance upon “joint capability managers” to define requirements and a central 
procurement office for weapons acquisition.  The Military Services, however, remain the 
single best source for coherent and integrated budgets within their respective domains.  
Therefore, the BG-N study team decided not to alter the basic organizational formula for 
how DoD allocates resources.  Managing resources on a distributed basis, however, 
requires a continuing focus on coordinating structures to compensate for the inter-Service 
problems and “seams.” 
 
• The Combatant Commanders, Military Services and defense agencies are the 
operating elements of the Department of Defense.  The Office of the Secretary 
of Defense and the Joint Staff, in large part, are the staffs that oversee these 
operations. 
 
The Secretary of Defense’s oversight of operations of a military nature is 
exercised through the Joint Staff (JS) and his oversight of operations of a management 
nature is through OSD.  As a general rule, the JS should not function as an operational 
general staff and OSD should not manage programs.  As staffs supporting the Secretary 
of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS, OSD and the JS should focus on policy 
formulation, policy representation and policy oversight in their respective areas of 
responsibility. 
• Ensuring a healthy competition of ideas on major issues is critical.   
The Secretary of Defense needs an NSC-like process that forces up options for his 
decision.  The CoComs, Military Services, the Joint Staff and OSD all bring valid 
perspectives to the table and should be heard.  Having a diversity of views on the most 
critical issues helps inform the Secretary’s decision by ensuring that key considerations 
are surfaced.  Nevertheless, a balance must be struck between processes that ensure a 
diversity of views on critical issues, and processes that create too many competing power 
centers and unnecessary friction.   
Conclusion    
 
 The BG-N study team’s approach to defense reform is based, first and foremost, 
on pragmatism.  We rely heavily on experience for identifying and addressing problems. 
We seek to preserve civilian control and maintain the institutional vitality of the Military 
Services while extending and broadening jointness where it makes sense.  The Services 
remain, however, primarily responsible for managing resources.  We also believe that the 
best ideas emerge from a healthy struggle between competing offices but try to limit that 
competition to major issues.  Our pragmatism may have led, in the eyes of some, to a lack 
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of boldness in our recommendations, but we believe caution is warranted.  Organizational 
reforms are rife with unintended consequences.  With the national security of our country 
on the line, our first principle must be to do no harm.    
Beyond Goldwater-Nichols:  Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
26
Chapter 4 
Rationalizing Organizational Structures in DoD 
 
Anybody who has worked in the Pentagon knows how difficult it is to get 
anything done.  Duplicative offices in OSD, the Joint Staff and the Military Departments 
can create excessive, wasteful coordination processes.  For example, the OSD manpower 
executive must deal with one Joint Staff, three civilian (in the Service Secretariats) and 
four military (in the Service Staffs) counterparts.  The arduous drill of getting all the 
“chops” required for advancing a proposal up the chain frustrates innovators, because 
those supporting the status quo have so many opportunities to block or dilute suggested 
changes.   
 
The friction inherent in a decision-making process that attempts to integrate 
policy in a decentralized institution has led, in the eyes of most observers, to overly large 
headquarters staffs that encourage a focus on small pieces of issues, often losing sight of 
the big picture.  This perception has led the last three Secretaries of Defense to impose 
(sometimes at the behest of Congress) across-the-board headquarters personnel cuts.  
These reductions have had uncertain effects as overworked action officers increasingly 
rely on field operating agencies (FOAs) and contractor support to get their jobs done.  
The conviction that headquarters staffs are too large also runs contrary to the frequently 
expressed view that there is too little civilian expertise, either in OSD or the USG, which 
leads to an over-reliance on uniformed military personnel to do jobs for which they are ill 
suited. 
 
There are no clear-cut rules for determining how much staff is enough.  In its 
discussions with current and former practioners, the BG-N study team often heard 
agreement with the general proposition that headquarters staff had grown too large, 
followed almost immediately (in some cases) with the lament that he or she was “under 
resourced” (that is, needed more people) for his or her responsibilities.  Most 
fundamentally, members of the BG-N working group on the resource allocation process 
agreed that decision-making processes invariably expand to fill the time made available 
to them: “If you give the Services 18 months to build their Program Objective 
Memorandums (POMs), it will take 18 months; if you give them a year, it will take a 
year.”  Similarly, OSD, which currently has about 2,100 authorized staff but relies on 
many more, would be just as busy if it had 20 percent more personnel.  It seems to be an 
iron law of governmental organizations that processes will expand to absorb the resources 
made available to them. 
 
While not at all confident that this problem is solvable, the BG-N study team 
believed that rationalizing and simplifying organizational structures in the Pentagon 
could result in organizational processes that are less onerous and demanding.7   The 
design principles for rationalizing DoD organizational structures reflect the CSIS 
approach to defense reform. 
                                                 
7 Organizational issues affecting the Unified and Specified Commands will be addressed in the Phase 2 
assessment of the Unified Command Plan (UCP).  The analysis here is confined to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the Military Departments.   
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Guiding Principles 
 
• Focus on key roles and responsibilities.   
 
The staffs of the Secretary, the Chairman and the Military Secretaries should 
focus on their essential functions in support of their principals and resist the temptation to 
“stray out of their lanes” and usurp the roles of others.  OSD, for example, should focus 
on policy formation and oversight, not program management, which is the province of 
the Military Services. 
 
• Preserve duplicative staff elements where a diversity of views is desired; 
consolidate elsewhere.   
 
Having multiple advocates ensures a healthy competition of ideas on major 
strategic choices facing the Secretary, but he does not need a full range of advocates on 
every issue.  For example, as the principal military adviser to the National Command 
Authority (NCA), the Chairman needs an independent staff to provide advice on military 
matters, but, in our judgment, does not need independent staffing for offering advice to 
the Secretary on manpower and logistics.  The Chairman, of course, needs staff expertise 
on manpower and logistics for the planning of military operations. 
 
Reducing the friction that plagues DoD decision-making will require a return to 
basics – define the essential role and responsibilities of the key players, focus their staffs 
on the essentials, discipline those who stray and consolidate functions where multiple 
advocates are not necessary. 
 
Key Roles and Responsibilities  
 
The Secretary of Defense, under the direction of the President, exercises 
authority, direction and control over all components of the Defense Department.  As 
mentioned previously, the report language for Goldwater-Nichols was emphatic on this 
point:  “The Secretary of Defense has sole and ultimate power within the Department of 
Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act.”  As the individual 
ultimately responsible for anything DoD does, the Secretary has the authority to run DoD 
in any matter he sees fit, subject, of course, to the direction of the President and the 
limitations imposed by Congress.  The recommendations offered here are not intended to 
limit the Secretary’s discretion, but to suggest guidelines for how his broad authority 
should be used. 
 
In a very real sense, all of the headquarters staff in the Pentagon support the 
Secretary of Defense since he is ultimately responsible for all actions of the Department.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, his personal staff, serves him best when it 
focuses upon policy formulation, policy representation, and policy oversight.  In the first 
role, OSD conducts analyses, develops policy options, provides advice, and makes 
recommendations to the Secretary for his consideration and adoption. OSD also 
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represents the Secretary in the interagency process, before the Congress and foreign 
governments, and with the general public.  Finally, OSD provides oversight of the 
implementation of DoD policies and programs to ensure they are consistent with the 
Secretary’s intent. 
 
OSD, of course, can perform other duties that the SecDef might prescribe.  
Although OSD elements have managed programs on occasion (e.g., environmental 
cleanup and nuclear threat reduction during the Clinton administration), their track record 
has been uneven at best.  More importantly, managers of programs tend to become 
advocates for those programs, rather than dispassionate evaluators of how well the 
program in question meets SecDef plans and priorities.  OSD management of programs 
compromises the essential role of OSD in policy formulation – namely, to provide an 
independent source of advice to the Secretary – and should be avoided.8  It should also be 
noted that OSD’s policy oversight function, if pursued too aggressively, could spill over 
into program management.  OSD oversight should focus on what a particular program or 
activity is accomplishing, rather than how those accomplishments are being achieved. 
 
Much of OSD’s oversight is conducted during the PPBE cycle and tends to focus 
on how well programs are executed (in terms of obligating funds) as an input to 
determining how much to allocate to that program in the next budget request.9  This is an 
important consideration, but OSD oversight should focus much more on how well DoD 
programs and activities are implementing SecDef guidance and priorities. 
 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the 
President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.  He also exercises 
authority, direction and control of the Joint Staff, which before Goldwater-Nichols 
reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a collective body.  In order to support the 
Chairman’s role as the principal military advisor, the Joint Staff must have an 
independent capability (from the Military Services, Combatant Commanders and OSD) 
on key military issues.  Defining what constitutes a “key military issue,” which requires 
an independent Joint Staff element, and what constitutes other defense issues, where the 
Secretary would be better served by an integrated civilian and military staff, is a matter of 
judgment. 
 
There are two line organizations in the Department of Defense – the Unified and 
Specified Combatant Commands and the Military Services.  The Commanders of the 
Unified Commands are the highest-ranking military officers in the chain of command for 
the conduct of military operations within their geographic areas of responsibility or 
functional areas of responsibility.  Goldwater-Nichols empowered the CoComs by giving 
them “combatant command” authority over assigned forces and establishing a chain of 
command that ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant 
                                                 
8 This report does not address the issue of OSD’s role in the acquisition process.  It will be addressed in 
Phase 2. 
9 In one of many changes that Secretary Rumsfeld has made to PPBS, he added an “E” for Execution, 
resulting in the PPBE system.  This and other allocation process reforms will be assessed in the next 
chapter. 
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Commander.  Although Goldwater-Nichols (as reflected in existing Title 10 language) 
states that the Secretary of Defense “may” communicate to the Combatant Commanders 
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the current Unified Command Plan 
states that the Secretary “shall” communicate with the CoComs through the CJCS.  In 
addition to giving CoComs combatant command authorities, subject to the direction of 
the Secretary of Defense and the President, Title 10 authorized them with “coordinating 
and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources 
and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out 
missions assigned to the commands.”  These latter authorities, except for SOCOM which 
was provided Title 10 authorities by Congress, are much less powerful in the face of the 
Title 10 responsibilities of the Military Services. 
 
The Military Services provide forces for employment by the Combatant 
Commanders.  The Service Chiefs are the senior military officers of their respective 
Services.  They also serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, like the CJCS, are 
military advisers to the National Command Authority.  The Service Chiefs rarely play 
this latter role as Presidents and Secretaries increasingly rely on the Combatant 
Commanders and the Chairman for military advice.   
 
By providing the Service Secretaries with authority over their departments and a 
large staff to support them, Goldwater-Nichols envisioned that the Secretary of Defense 
would exercise civilian control of the military through the Service Secretaries.  With rare 
exceptions, however, Secretaries have relied on the OSD Under Secretaries who deal 
directly with their counterparts in the Service Staffs, rather than the Service 
Secretariats, in managing DoD affairs.  In part, this practice reflects Defense 
Secretaries’ collective judgment that their OSD Under Secretaries are both more able and 
more likely to pursue faithfully SecDef priorities than the Service Secretaries who may 
be “captured” by their Military Service.10  It also reflects the practice of many 
administrations to populate the Military Departments with political appointments.  
Service Secretaries, however, continue to play an important representational role, 
particularly in Congress, and often provide the best means for handling difficult and 
politically charged social issues.  
 
Recommendations   
 
• Merge most of each Service Secretariat into a single, smaller integrated staff 
that reports to both the Service Secretary and Chief. 
 
The most significant consolidation of staffs should occur at the level of the 
Military Departments.  The operational arm of DoD for management matters is the 
                                                 
10 On taking office, Secretary Rumsfeld created the Senior Executive Council (SEC), which included the 
Service Secretaries and top OSD civilians but no uniformed personnel, to serve as the senior management 
group.  He learned quickly that the uniformed chiefs of the Services needed to be included in the process if 
decisions taken in the senior management group were to have any traction in the Military Services.  The 
Senior Leadership Review Group (SLRG), which included both the Service Secretary (or Deputy 
Secretary) and the Chief (or Vice Chief) of the Services, as well as the Chairman (or Vice Chairman) of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, soon emerged as the senior management forum. 
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Military Services.  The Secretary of Defense relies primarily on OSD for the oversight 
function, not the now-duplicative Service Secretariats.  As can be seen in current 
organizational charts (see Appendix 3), the Secretariats and Service Staffs are virtual 
“mirror images” of each other (with the Army’s being the most exact duplication).  In the 
candid judgment of most observers, the “real work” at headquarters is done by the 
Service Staffs, which, particularly with respect to personnel, installations and financial 
issues, must coordinate with their civilian counterparts.   
 
Although there are undoubtedly many instances where this extra layer of review 
has made positive contributions, the value added by Secretariat review is far exceeded by 
the costs of maintaining duplicative staffs at the Department level.  Too much of the 
Secretariat-Staff interaction is needless friction that consumes staff time and adds little 
value in enhancing the independence of military advice.  By far the most important 
civilian-military relationship at the headquarters staff level is that between OSD and the 
Service Staffs.  In fact, considerable Secretariat energy goes into discovering what is 
going on between OSD and their uniformed Service counterparts and seeking their 
rightful place at the table.  Substantially reducing the Service Secretariats would reduce 
incoherency at the top of the Military Departments and enable each of the Military 
Services to speak with one voice.  While there is a case to be made for DoD having two 
representatives (OSD and the Joint Staff) in the interagency process, there is little value 
in the Military Departments having both Service and Secretariat representation at internal 
DoD meetings in the Pentagon.  
 
The Service Secretariats grew during the 1950s when OSD was relatively weak 
and the President relied upon the Service Secretaries as his principal means of exercising 
civilian control of the military.  Responsibility for civilian oversight has increasingly 
shifted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  The nature of the Service Secretary’s 
job as evolved from a staff function to a “line” function.  The Service Secretary no longer 
needs a large, separate secretariat and would be better served by a more integrated team. 
 
With the progressive evolution of substantive control immediately under the 
Secretary of Defense, the role of the Service Secretariats has been diminished.  
Consequently, it is proving harder to recruit first-line talent to what are increasingly seen 
as second-tier positions.  There have been, of course, strong and effective Service 
Secretaries, such as John Lehman and Don Rice.  But their effectiveness stemmed from 
their personal attributes and credibility as leaders, not from having a large independent 
staff. 
 
Although most of the practitioners consulted by the BG-N study group favored 
significant reductions in the size of the Secretariats, few recommended eliminating the 
Service Secretaries themselves.  At a minimum, Service Secretaries provide the civilian 
capstone necessary for military institutions in the American political system.  They also 
play an important representational role, particularly in Congress, and provide a political 
perspective that is often invaluable to a Service Chief.  When a Military Service faces a 
scandal such as Tailhook or Aberdeen, Service Secretaries are especially useful to the 
Secretary of Defense because they provide a civilian layer of accountability between the 
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Military Service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  Finally, Service Secretaries 
provide the Secretary of Defense with an additional means (beyond his Under 
Secretaries) for implementing his policies and priorities. 
 
Service Secretaries have often served as effective change agents in their 
departments, particularly in the Department of the Navy where the Secretary’s leverage is 
greater because he can “play off” two Military Services against each other.  By virtue of 
being much closer to their uniformed Services than the OSD Under Secretaries, Service 
Secretaries can also provide critical counsel to the Secretary of Defense on senior 
military appointments, one of the primary tools available to the civilian leadership for 
transforming the military.  A potential downside to our recommendation that most of 
each Service Secretariat should be merged into a single, smaller integrated staff that 
reports to both the Service Secretary and the Chief is that it could make it even harder for 
a pro-active Service Secretary to support change.  Proposals for empowering the Service 
Secretaries – for example, giving the Secretary a greater role in appointing the Service 
Chief or shortening the Chief’s current tenure (from four years to two years with an 
option to extend) – were considered by the BG-N study team, but not accepted, in part, 
because they might undercut the role of Service Chiefs as the institutional leader of their 
Service by making them more of an extension of a particular administration.  Moreover, 
the BG-N team concluded that a Secretariat constructed along the lines described in the 
next paragraph would provide a capable Service Secretary with all the staff horsepower 
that he or she would need. 
 
A Secretariat that is appropriate for the Service Secretary’s actual role, rather than 
the role suggested by his formal authorities, would be much smaller.  The General 
Counsel (GC) and the Inspector General (IG) should remain as direct reports to the 
Secretary, both for legal and functional reasons.  In addition to supporting the Service 
Secretary, who is formally in charge of the Military Service, the GC provides the 
interface between the military justice system and the civilian legal system.  The Congress 
established the IG as a direct report to the Secretary to ensure its independence.  The 
legislative affairs function should also remain part of the Secretariat to ensure civilian 
representation to the Congress on the full range of departmental issues. The Secretary 
also needs a small independent executive action group to staff selected Secretarial 
initiatives.   
 
With the possible exception of the Assistant Secretaries for Acquisition – whose 
status will be addressed in the Phase 2 analysis of defense acquisition – the BG-N study 
team recommends that the rest of the Secretariats either be disbanded (in the case of 
duplicative offices) or integrated (in the case of complementary offices) into the existing 
Service Staffs.  In the Army’s recent consolidation of Service Staffs and Secretariats 
(which reportedly freed up over 600 billets), it retained the civilian Assistant Secretaries 
and paired each with a three-star officer with similar responsibility.  This ensured that the 
Service Chief would have a uniformed chain of command (from him to the 3-star Deputy 
Assistant Secretaries) and that the Service Secretary could “reach below” the Service 
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Chief and deal directly with the civilian Assistant Secretaries.  The former Service 
Secretaries that we consulted favored this approach.11  
 
Eliminating or consolidating much of the Secretariat into the Service Staff will 
ensure that the Service Chief has authority commensurate with his responsibility and 
provides clearer lines of accountability.  This streamlined organizational structure also 
should reduce intra-departmental friction and enable the Departments to speak with one 
voice in internal DoD meetings. 
 
• For the personnel and logistics function, create an integrated civilian and 
military staff under a military deputy who reports directly to his respective 
Under Secretary. 
 
Ensuring a competition of ideas in DoD usually requires duplicative officers 
bringing diverse perspectives to bear.  The “light” shed on a particular issue comes at a 
cost, namely the “heat” of bureaucratic competition that adds friction to decision-making 
processes.  On some issues, the Secretary will want a diversity of views, despite the 
losses in efficiency.  On other issues, he will not.  In some instances, an integrated 
civilian and military staff would better serve the Secretary by strengthening policy 
formation and civilian oversight.  Determining how DoD should be organized for a 
particular function cannot be done with scientific precision – it is a matter of judgment 
and the decision, of course, belongs to the Secretary. 
 
The search for potential consolidation of OSD and Joint Staff offices should begin 
with the Chairman’s role as the principal military advisor to the National Command 
Authority.  While the Secretary of Defense might welcome the Chairman’s advice on all 
DoD matters, does the Secretary need the Chairman to be independently staffed on every 
issue given to DoD?  Or would the Secretary be better served by having a consolidated 
staff of civilian and uniformed personnel that reports directly to him while keeping the 
Chairman informed?   
 
The BG-N study team believes that the following Joint Staff offices are critical to 
the Chairman’s role as principal military advisor and should thus be retained: J-2 
(Intelligence),12 J-3 (Operations), J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) and J-8 (Force 
Structure, Resources & Assessment).  The case for keeping J-2 and J-3 is obvious.  
Although some have proposed combining J-5 with its OSD counterparts, doing so 
implicitly assumes that it is possible to separate the purely military aspects of an 
                                                 
11Because the Department of the Navy has two Military Services, it will need to be organized differently 
from the other two Services.  The current Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, reports that at the 
beginning of his term, he “slimmed down” his secretariat by about 300 billets as he sought to create a 
civilian-Navy-Marine “team approach” to managing his Department.  Although the Navy’s current 
organizational structure differs from that recommended here (see Appendix 3), the intent expressed by 
Secretary England is quite similar.  The Under Secretary of the Air Force is also the Director of the 
National Reconnaissance Office and the Executive Agent for DoD Space.  This latter arrangement will be 
addressed in BG-N Phase 2.  
12 As a directorate in the Defense Intelligence Agency, a field agency that reports to the Secretary of 
Defense, J-2 is already part of an integrated office that serves both the Secretary and the Chairman.   
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operation from the political.  The interconnectedness of the political and military 
dimensions, however, suggests that any military operation must be viewed as a “pol-mil” 
issue of key importance, one that requires an independent staff for the Chairman.  
Similarly, the Secretary needs the Chairman to play a key role in the resource allocation 
process and the determination of joint capability needs.  For this, the Chairman needs an 
independent analytic capability.  Virtually all observers agree that, of all the headquarter 
staffs, the Joint Staff is the most competent.  Focusing on the core areas defined above (J-
2, J-3, J-5 and J-8), particularly if supplemented by resources freed up in other areas, 
could enable a great staff to perform even better.   
 
Neither the Secretary nor the Chairman needs competing sources of advice on 
personnel matters.  Therefore, the BG-N study team recommends combining elements of 
J-1 (Manpower and Personnel) and the relevant parts of OSD, Personnel and Readiness 
(P&R) under a military deputy to the Under Secretary (P&R).  Responsibility for joint 
officer management and human resources should be moved out of headquarters to a field 
operating agency (FOA) that reports to the Chairman.  In contrast to personnel matters, 
however, both the SecDef and Chairman need much stronger support on the logistics 
function.  
 
Logistics is an $85 billion enterprise that is not well understood, receives little 
guidance and far too little oversight from either OSD or the Joint Staff.  Transportation 
Command (TRANSCOM) has recently been made the “distribution process owner” for 
the entire supply management system, a move that might presage the creation of a 
logistics command by combining TRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics Agency.   
Integrating much of J-4 (Logistics) with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Material Readiness under a three-star deputy to the Under Secretary of 
Defense for AT&L would be a major step in ensuring sufficient OSD attention to this 
critical function.  In fact, it would empower the uniformed deputy by bringing him closer 
to the signature authority of the Secretary of Defense to direct the Military Services to 
dispatch commodities.  The Secretary could delegate that authority to the civilian Under 
Secretary.  Responsibility for operational logistics planning should reside with a two-star 
deputy to the J-3 (with an appropriate staff), who would serve as the Joint Staff’s senior 
logistician. Rounding out this recommendation, the Joint Logistics Operations Center 
should move inside the J-3. 
 
Our recommendations with respect to J-6 (Command, Control, Communications, 
and Computers (C4) Systems) reflect our judgment that in the area of command and 
control (C2), it is time to make an exception to our guiding principle that resources 
should be managed and budgeted along Service lines.  This will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter 6.  DoD has been struggling for almost two decades to build interoperable, joint 
Command and Control (C2), yet we are still deploying forces to the field that cannot 
communicate with each other.  For understandable reasons, the Military Departments 
have focused first on making their internal assets work and then tried to grow toward the 
center to achieve interoperability.  In repeated efforts to persuade the Military Services to 
buy compatible communication systems, J-6 and its civilian counterpart, the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA), have attempted to build operational architectures 
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and set standards for interoperability.  Yet the separate Military Departments are still 
fielding incompatible communications systems.  We need an enterprise-wide solution to 
an enterprise-wide problem. 
 
The BG-N study team recommends, therefore, that J-6 be converted into the core 
of a new department-wide, military task force (with budgetary and acquisition authority) 
for joint C2.  This recommendation will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 6.  As 
we recommend for the logistics function, the responsibility for operational planning for 
C4 could be assigned to a deputy J-3 for C4.  An alternative approach would be to follow 
the DIA and J-2 model with one of the deputies of this new joint C2 task force double-
hatted as the J-6.   
 
The responsibilities of J-7 (Operational Plans and Joint Force Development) have 
migrated steadily to the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), which now has primary 
responsibility for joint training, exercises and experimentation.  Its remaining 
responsibilities could easily be merged into other offices.  Deliberate planning in the 
regional commands is done by their J-5s; this function should be done by J-5 at 
headquarters as well, if only to enhance parallelism.  This migration would reduce some 
duplication on the Joint Staff itself, since it now has regional offices in J-3, J-5 and J-7.  
Responsibility for transformation could be passed to J-8.   
 
In addition, none of the Military Services use their headquarters staff for writing 
doctrine; they either have commands or doctrine centers.  Responsibility for joint 
doctrine should therefore move to a Joint Doctrine Center; responsibility for it and joint 
education should pass from J-7 to the Joint Forces Command.  This shift would probably 
require legislative relief (since Joint Doctrine is a responsibility of the Chairman) and 
JFCOM would have to be resourced for its new responsibilities.  
 
An organization establishes focus by deciding what it is going to do and what it is 
not going to do.  A Joint Staff that is focused on its most important substantive areas – 
namely, the issues addressed by J-2, J-3, J-5 and J-8 – will be even more effective, thus 
enhancing their already considerable clout in the competition of ideas. 
 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense currently consists of 34 major offices, 
with 16 offices reporting directly to the Secretary (that is, “direct reports”) and about 
2100 authorized staff.  How many personnel actually work for OSD is difficult to 
determine because of the many field operating agencies, FFRDCs (federally funded R&D 
centers), and contractors that support OSD.  Nonetheless, virtually all of the practitioners 
consulted by the BG-N study team agree that OSD should focus on policy formation, 
representation and oversight, and should avoid program management.  Our analysis 
adheres to this axiom notwithstanding, as one former Secretary of Defense noted, that 
OSD’s impulse to manage is nearly impossible to resist when things are being managed 
badly and the Secretary is being held accountable.   
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• Focus OSD on policy formation and oversight, elevate its focus on C3, and 
consolidate housekeeping functions under an Assistant Secretary. 
 
The BG-N study team initially favored reducing the number of direct reports to 
the Secretary of Defense because an excessively broad span of control dilutes his 
authority and accountability.  We developed a number of options for streamlining the 
direct reports that former senior defense officials argued strongly against – for example, 
an analog to what exists in the Department of State, where an Under Secretary for 
Management has Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, General Counsel, the Inspector 
General, the Executive Secretary and Administration in his portfolio.  Similarly, many 
observers believe that the Secretary, as the chief executive officer (CEO) of DoD, needs a 
Deputy who functions as the chief operating officer (COO) and “runs the building.”  
Others believed that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary needed a chief of staff who had 
directive authority over the Under Secretaries.  The Secretary also has a set of offices that 
report directly to him and support him as he relates to the world outside of DoD.  It is 
widely felt that no independent study of organizational structure can or should supercede 
the Secretary’s right to organize his operations in the way he feels best support his 
obligations.  
 
Consequently, the BG-N slate of recommendations for the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense is quite modest in scope.  OSD should retain the Under Secretaries for Policy, 
Comptroller, Acquisition, and Personnel and Readiness.  This structure maintains OSD’s 
functional focus on ideas, dollars, things and people.  To create more headroom at the 
senior level for top-flight career professionals, OSD should return to the practice in the 
1950s of appointing permanent civil servants as the Principal Deputies (this proposal will 
be addressed further in Chapter 7).  Finally, we recommend that all OSD housekeeping 
functions be consolidated into one portfolio under an Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Administration.  Consolidating the Washington Headquarters Service (currently a field 
operating agency) and the Executive Secretariat will give the Secretary greater control 
over OSD mechanics. 
 
Given the importance of C3 in Information Age net-centric warfare, this function 
needs greater organizational status and capability in OSD.  A stand-alone Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (NII) will lack sufficient 
weight in the resource allocation process.  Our recommendation to merge elements of J-6 
and DISA into a JTF for Joint C2 would establish the Secretary’s operational arm for 
department-wide procurement of C2 systems.  Staff oversight of this critical function 
should not be provided by a third-tier office.  The BG-N study team, therefore, 
recommends that the C3 function be elevated to the Under Secretary level and be 
combined again with Intelligence, creating an Under Secretary for C3I.  We had 
considered creating a separate Under Secretary for C3 but this would have created three 
more “fault lines” – with USD(I), USD(P) and USD(AT&L), respectively – in addition to 
those that already exist between Intelligence, Policy and Acquisition.  Most of the high-
level former officials we consulted strongly favored re-integrating C3 with Intelligence at 
the Under Secretary level.  
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The BG-N study team further recommends that the offices of Public Affairs, 
Legislative Affairs, General Counsel, Inspector General, PA&E, Net Assessment and 
Force Transformation should remain direct reports to the Secretary of Defense. This 
determination is based on a number of considerations.  First, PA, LA and GC provide 
personal advice on how the Secretary handles critical functions and are frequently staffed 
by the Secretary’s closest advisors.  Second, Congress has chartered the IG as a direct 
report to the Secretary.  (The case for PA&E as a direct report will be made in Chapter 5.)  
Third, the impact of the future-oriented Office of Net Assessments has always depended 
on the relationship between the Secretary and the current (and thus far only) Director, 
Andrew Marshall.  Fourth, establishing the Office of Force Transformation demonstrated 
the priority that Secretary Rumsfeld attached to defense transformation.   
 
More generally, the Secretary should always have the option of empowering 
someone to advance a prized initiative.  Over time, the Secretary might consider 
combining the responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy, who currently supports the Secretary directly on strategic issues, and the Directors 
of Net Assessments and Force Transformation into a single Director of Strategic Planning 
who reports directly to him.  While combining these three offices might improve the 
coherency of the strategic planning function, it would also reduce the diversity of 
perspectives on strategic issues.  Given the special responsibility of the Secretary of 
Defense for DoD’s future, each Secretary will ultimately decide for himself how he wants 
this function performed.    
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the BG-N recommendations for streamlining OSD fall quite 
short of those recommended for the Joint Staff and the Military Departments, even 
though many observers would rank OSD as the poorest performer of the three 
headquarters staffs.  This suggests that the problems that have caused the perceived lack 
of OSD effectiveness are most likely not organizational in nature.  This issue will be 
addressed further in Chapter 7.  
 
Conclusion    
 
Merging much of the Service Secretariats into the Service Staffs should improve 
coherency and unity of effort in the Military Departments.  It should also empower the 
Service Chiefs in their role as CEOs for the Military Services.  Integrating civilian and 
military staffs in the personnel and logistics functions should provide more robust support 
to the Secretary and Chairman and reduce unnecessary organizational friction in these 
areas.  Retaining J-2, J-3, J-5 and J-8 will enable the Chairman to fulfill his role as the 
principal military advisor to the National Command Authority. Finally, focusing OSD on 
policy formation and oversight, not program management, should ensure that OSD does 
not take on responsibilities for which it is ill-suited.   
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Chapter 5 
Toward a More Effective Resource Allocation Process 
 
Many critics call the Defense Department’s resource allocation process “The 
Pentagon’s real wars.”  Deciding who gets what, and then making that decision stick, is 
perhaps the Secretary’s most formidable challenge.  Notwithstanding the contests of will 
that remain a fixture of this annual process, our approach to improving it never strayed 
from the guiding principle that resources should be organized, managed and budgeted 
along Service lines.  Upholding this principle necessitates an elaborate structure to ensure 
that the Services follow the Secretary’s policy directives and build a collective defense 
program that balances across the largest organization in the world.  Reality dictates that 
any such system is going to be elaborate, complicated and, at times, inefficient.   
 
There is another reality that to a great extent imposes its will on the entire 
budgeting process and which, at least to some extent, stifles further innovation:  DoD 
needs to get money each and every year from the Congress.  DoD has developed highly 
elaborate systems and methods toward that end.  As one former senior defense official 
commented in a BG-N meeting, “DoD has two core competencies – winning wars and 
getting money from Congress.”  We should recognize, therefore, that not all shortfalls in 
the process are self-inflicted. 
 
That said, as evidenced by Secretary Rumsfeld’s early difficulties during his “top-
to-bottom strategic review” and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Defense 
Secretaries find it extremely difficult to make tough trade-off decisions between the 
Military Services and military functions.  Despite the laudable intent of the Pentagon’s 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Execution System (PPBE), budgeting decisions are 
dominated by factors other than strategy and planning.  The lack of discipline in the 
resource allocation process causes chronic program instability and encourages budgetary 
gamesmanship – the resources required to execute DoD programs exceed available funds 
by at least 25 percent.13   
 
Although OSD (and the Military Services) attempt to provide front-end planning 
guidance, the Services build the first budgetary documents when they turn their Program 
Objective Memorandums (POMs) into OSD.  As a result, there is weak advocacy of the 
joint perspective in this Service-centric process, as Service-prepared budgets, not 
surprisingly, reflect Service priorities.  The process of allocating resources that are 
insufficient to meet the demand require Herculean efforts by all involved to avert the 
annual “train wreck” as the Pentagon scrambles to prepare the President’s budget request 
to Congress.  Few strategic decisions are made during the frenzied end game to make the 
fiscal “bogey” that sets the “top line” for the defense budget.  The entire process 
consumes so much time and resources that little attention is paid to policy 
implementation and program execution. 
 
                                                 
13 The Aldridge task force, which Secretary Rumsfeld commissioned to examine how DoD develops, 
resources, and provides joint capabilities, estimated that fully funding recent Defense Planning Guidances 
would have required between 1.3 and 1.8 times the funds available. 
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Defense Secretary Robert McNamara installed PPBS in the early 1960s, as he 
combined successful business practices of the 1950s with theories of government 
management developed at the RAND Corporation and leading business schools.  
Although its critics are legion – for example, Secretary Rumsfeld on his return to DoD 
dismissed PPBS as “an antique, and it works poorly”14 – recent administrations, including 
the current one, have decided upon close examination that there is no practical alternative 
to PPBS and have focused upon improving it.  PPBS has serious downsides.  It rewards 
incrementalism, consumes enormous resources and often locks the Secretary into narrow 
channels for making his biggest decisions.  But it does provide an integrating process 
across the Defense Department, and it does produce decisions.  In short, the system 
works.  
 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s efforts to reform the re-named PPBE system have been 
more ambitious than most.  This chapter describes the changes currently being made to 
the resource allocation process, assesses the likely impact of recent reforms and 
recommends ways to build on them.   
 
Rumsfeld Era Changes    
 
In May 2003, DoD adopted a two-year budget (for FY04-09), although budget 
submissions to Congress will still be made annually.  Specifically, the Military Services 
and Defense Agencies would not submit POMs or Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs) 
for FY05-9, but will submit changes to the baseline established by the President’s FY 
2004 Budget Submission Future-Years Defense Program (FYDP).   This “off-year” 
update would be carried out by Program Change Proposals (PCPs) for “real world 
changes” exceeding $250M across the FYDP, and Budget Change Proposals (BCPs) for 
“fact-of-life” changes (e.g., cost increases, schedule delays, management reform savings, 
workload changes, etc.) as well as changes resulting from Congressional action.   
 
In another departure from past practice, the Comptroller and PA&E, after merging 
their data collection and management processes into a single “program-and-budget 
system,” would conduct their program review and budget reviews simultaneously, rather 
than sequentially.  One of the purposes of moving to an internal two-year budget and a 
simultaneous program and budget review is to free up time to assess whether DoD 
achieved its planned performance goals.  Although Execution was added to PPBS in May 
2003, as DoD went from PPBS to the PPBE system, it was not until 31 October 2003 that 
Mr. Ken Krieg (Director of PA&E), Dr. Dov Zakheim (Under Secretary (Comptroller)), 
Lt Gen James “Hoss” Cartwright (Director of J-8) and Mr. Ryan Henry (Principal Deputy 
Under Secretary for Policy or PDUSD(P)) were tasked as “Co-Leads” to develop “an 
annual review of how well program implementation and budget execution are meeting 
identified joint warfighting needs.” 
 
On June 24, 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the policies 
and procedures for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
                                                 
14 Transcript of Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Town Hall Meeting with 
Troops at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, April 18, 2002. 
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that would identify, assess and prioritize joint military capability needs.  Intended to 
replace the Service-centric requirements generation process with a joint, capabilities-
based approach, JCIDS established both new institutions and new documents: 
 
• Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs).  The Joint Warfighting Capability 
Assessment (JWCA) teams were replaced by O-7-led FCBs that would review 
Service-proposed functional needs analysis (that replaced the old Mission Needs 
Statement) and Initial Capability Documents (that replaced the Operational 
Requirements Documents) to ensure compliance with the series of JCIDS 
documents (see below) and to make recommendations to the Joint Requirements 
Board or JRB (the J-8-chaired body of flag and general officers from the Services 
with requirements-generation responsibilities) and the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (the VCJCS-chaired body consisting of the second-ranking 
officers of the Military Services). 
 
• Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC).  As the foundation of this new capabilities-
based approach, the Joint Staff prepared a JOpsC, approved by the Secretary in 
November 2003, that will serve as the inspiration for a series of Joint Operating 
Concepts (four, including homeland security, major combat operations, stability 
operations and strategic defense, have been tasked), Joint Functional Concepts, 
Enabling Concepts, and Integrated Architectures that, in turn, will be synthesized 
into a JROC-approved, prioritized list of capability needs and recommended 
DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, 
personnel and facilities) changes. 
 
Many, including some at CSIS, were skeptical of the new Joint Staff approach to 
defining joint capability needs.  The FCBs appeared to be another “multi-Service” office 
(like the JRB and JROC) that would add another layer of review and still enable a 
Service-centric perspective to prevail through the consensual, logrolling nature that often 
characterizes Joint Staff decision-making.  Moreover, the draft JOpsC, with its broad 
statement of how the Future Joint Force will achieve Full Spectrum Dominance and its 
expansive list of the attributes of the future force, suggested that the hierarchy of JOpsC-
inspired documents would never achieve the level of granularity necessary to assess 
whether a Service-backed solution addressed the capability gap. 
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As illustrated in the chart on the JCIDS Issue Process (provided to the BG-N  
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study team in February 2003), the process has both matured and become much more 
ambitious.  The Functional Capability Boards are now “departmental” bodies with DoD-
wide representation.  FCBs for Force Application, Force Protection, Focused Logistics 
and Battlespace Awareness already have been established.  FCBs for Command and 
Control and Net-Centric Warfare are under development.  The FCBs will now anchor a 
process that covers all sources of inputs about capability needs into DoD actions.  In 
recognition that the JOpsC and its derivative 2nd-tier concepts, the Joint Operating and 
Joint Functional Concepts, would not be specific enough to provide assessment criteria, 
the FCBs will use a set of 3rd-tier “integrating concepts,” formerly known as “enabling 
concepts,” as the basis of their review.  Although the integrating concepts for undersea 
superiority and joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) are nearing completion, most of the 
twenty-plus integrating concepts have yet to be written.  The Functional Capability 
Boards, however, already are being used to process the Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) 
submitted by the Combatant Commanders.     
 
On October 27, 2003, the Secretary approved a “streamlined and refocused 
Integrated Priority List process” that calls on the CoComs to identify potential capability 
shortfalls to carry out responsibilities identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance, 
Security Cooperation Guidance or Defense Planning Guidance.  Although Secretary 
Rumsfeld offered the CoComs the opportunity to brief the Secretary and the Chairman on 
their IPL submissions, the IPLs were reviewed by J-8 in their “gate keeping” role (see 
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chart on the JCIDS issue process) and are, as of February 2004, being vetted by the FCBs 
for incorporation into the Joint Programming Guidance for FY 2006-2011.  
 
On October 31, 2003, the Secretary signed a memorandum, entitled the “Initiation 
of a Joint Capabilities Development Process,” that partially implemented the Aldridge 
study recommendations.  Most notably, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) was 
replaced by two documents:  
 
• The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).  This is a single, “fiscally-informed 
document that will replace the policy/strategy sections” of the DPG.  Originally 
scheduled for December 2003, the SPG was reviewed in late January 2004 by the 
newly formed Strategic Planning Council (see below) and was slated to be 
published in February. 
 
• The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG).  This is a “fiscally constrained” 
document (due in the Spring) that would replace the programming elements of the 
DPG and “will record the decisions reached in the enhanced planning process.”  
The JPG also will “include a demonstration that the totality of the programmatic 
guidance provided in the SPG and JPG is fiscally executable.”  
 
In this “simplified resourcing process,” “programs and budgets are developed [by the 
Services and defense agencies] in response to the JPG and are reviewed for compliance 
with it.” 
 
To initiate the “enhanced planning process” (EPP), the PDUSD(P), “in 
conjunction with” the Directors of PA&E and J-8 and “in consultation” with the 
membership of the Senior Leadership Review Group (SLRG), should develop a list of 
candidate major issues for an “enhanced, collaborative joint planning process” that will 
result “in decisions on major issues and metrics and measures of sufficiency for other 
elements of the Defense Program.”  In late November 2003, the SLRG discussed an 
initial set of 8 issues and formed respective issue teams.  In this initial run of the EPP, 
there reportedly will be some flexibility about which issues are actually brought before 
the Secretary of Defense. 
 
In a final move, Secretary Rumsfeld also formed a Strategic Planning Council 
(SPC), chaired by the SecDef, which includes the SLRG principals and the Combatant 
Commanders.  The new SPC is designed to meet several times a year to review the SPG, 
JPG and the annual execution review.  It met for the first time in late January on the heels 
of the Combatant Commander’s Conference.  The Secretary of Defense attended the 
inaugural SPC meeting, which, among other things, discussed the draft SPG and a newly 
drafted defense strategy.  Participants thought the first meeting of the SPC went well, 
although the IPLs received little attention.  
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Assessment of Rumsfeld Era Changes 
 
The fast pace at which Secretary Rumsfeld and his team have introduced changes 
into the resource allocation process during 2003 has surprised many observers.15  In our 
view, these recent changes are clearly steps in the right direction, although it is too early 
to reach final judgment.  Of particular importance, we believe, are the following 
developments: 
 
• The Enhanced Planning Process.  The most important products of any planning 
process are decisions by the senior leadership on the strategic choices facing the 
organization.  Identifying the major issues, ensuring a competition of ideas from 
multiple perspectives, making a decision and then implementing that decision are 
major challenges for any CEO, much less the SecDef who operates in an 
extremely difficult political context.  The EPP sets up a process for making major 
decisions whose results are enforced by the JPG.  If it happens, this would 
constitute a significant breakthrough.  However, it will be critical to harmonize 
issues addressed in the enhanced planning process (EPP) and the JCIDS process. 
 
• The FCB-anchored JCIDS Issue Process.  The weak advocacy of the joint 
perspective during the resource allocation process has allowed a Service-centric 
requirements generation process to dominate DoD decisions about which 
capabilities to buy.  If the Joint Staff can build a set of joint integrating concepts 
“with teeth” (that is, enough specificity about the key performance parameters 
that define the capability) and the department-level FCBs actually apply those 
standards in passing on Service submissions, this too would be a breakthrough. 
 
• A Stronger Role for the Combatant Commanders.  Attempting to reinvigorate the 
IPL process and creating a Strategic Planning Council are important 
developments.  The August 2003 Defense Science Board (DSB) study on 
“Enabling Joint Force Capabilities” stated:  “The business of the combatant 
commands is the Department’s core business and the inability to relate resource 
allocations to its core business should be regarded as a fundamental failure in how 
DoD understands its own business.” 
 
There is nothing simpler about the amended PPBS system – a goal of the Aldridge 
study and one that the BG-N study team applauds – but it does have the potential to 
strengthen both the strategic direction and the joint perspective in the resource allocation 
process, provided, of course, that changes work as intended.  
 
                                                 
15 It was in part the desultory efforts at reforming PPBS during 2001 and 2002 that led CSIS to address this 
issue during Phase 1 of Beyond Goldwater-Nichols.  Given the magnitude of recent changes, it might have 
been better to assess them during Phase 2 after more time had elapsed.  As it is, CSIS will return to this 
issue in its BG-N Phase 2 report, tentatively scheduled for February 2005. 
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However, the BG-N study team does have implementation concerns.  Most how-
to books on organizational change underscore the importance of identifying a person or 
an office and supplying the resources necessary to make change happen.  In this case, the 
Secretary established three or four “co-leads” for the major process changes.  Often, a co-
lead means there is no lead.  In this instance, the close relationship between Mr. Krieg, Lt 
Gen Cartwright and Mr. Henry seems to have paid dividends, particularly with respect to 
the evolution of the FCBs as department level bodies and their integration into the EPP.  
But there is the attendant risk of building new processes around individual personalities 
rather than institutions. 
 
The BG-N study team also is concerned about whether the key institutions – the 
Combatant Commanders, J-8 and PA&E – have the capacity to play stronger roles.  For 
example, many of the regional CoComs do not even have their own J-8s, relying instead 
on small offices in their J-5s, and these offices are supposed to do rigorous capability gap 
analysis.  Similarly, J-8 in Washington already is stretched pretty thin, yet needs to 
produce the key set of joint integrating concepts.  The October 31, 2003 SecDef memo 
stated: “Although some organizational changes may ultimately be needed to optimize the 
new process, its initial implementation will be carried forward by existing organizations.”  
This may be a mistake.  New organizational capacities may be critical at the very 
beginning to overcome bureaucratic resistance.  Empowering new actors (such as the 
CoComs) with new responsibilities but without new resources can be an empty mandate. 
   
While the intent to make strategic choices early in the PPBE process laudably 
adheres to most critiques of DoD’s resource allocation process (including the Defense 
Science Board’s August 2003 study on Enabling Joint Capabilities), it flies in the face of 
the political reality that the Secretary of Defense is simultaneously engaged in three 
processes – planning for the next POM-Budget submission, defending next year’s budget 
request in Congress and executing the current budget.  The oft-cited aphorism “Make no 
decision before its time” reflects the natural tendency for senior defense officials to wait 
until after Congress has passed the budget for the fiscal year beginning in October –
which, with continuing resolutions, can often take several more weeks, if not months –
before taking major decisions about the budget request that goes to Congress in February.   
 
It is not simply the lack of intestinal fortitude that prevents Secretaries from 
making tough decisions in the planning process (although that is sometimes the case) –
there are sound political reasons for not doing so.  Making strategic decisions early on in 
the EPP and then implementing them during the budgeting cycle via the Joint 
Programming Guidance is rational from an organizational perspective.  But making and 
incorporating those decisions in a JPG that is published in the spring for a fiscal year that 
begins 16-17 months away, at the same time that Congress is considering the budget for a 
year that begins in four to five months, is not rational from a political perspective.  
 
Finally, the BG-N study team is concerned that DoD’s ostensible focus on policy 
implementation and execution review has been lost.  The May 2003 move to a two-year 
budget was supposed to free up time for execution review, as PPBS became the PPBE 
system.  Not surprisingly, the effort associated with making all the changes enumerated 
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above appears to have pushed execution aside.  Longer-term plans envision publishing an 
annual Performance Assessment Report that is reviewed by the Strategic Planning 
Council and published in January as part of the Annual Defense Report.  This timing for 
execution review poses a likely conflict between the budgeting end game (which 
consumes the Pentagon in the October-December time frame) and the Extended Planning 
Process (which begins in November and must be completed before the JPG is issued in 
the spring).    
 
Recommendations 
 
The BG-N study team supports the substantial effort Secretary Rumsfeld has 
made to enhance strategic direction and the building of joint capabilities in the resource 
allocation process.  The changes made during 2003 have considerable promise, but more, 
we believe, is necessary for them to be implemented fully.  As a consequence, we 
recommend the following: 
 
• Build capacities in the Combatant Commands for a stronger role in the 
resource allocation process. 
 
Revitalizing the IPL process must include stronger IPLs from the Combatant 
Commands.  If there is any area where the voice of the Combatant Commands should 
dominate, it is in defining the short-term capability gaps the CoComs experience in 
conducting today’s missions.  The JCIDS Issue Process provides a forum, but it requires 
analytically rigorous, capability gap analysis to prevail.  Establishing the performance 
metrics of the capabilities needed for a particular mission requires experienced analysts.  
The CoComs need stronger J-8s to compete in this arena. 
 
While the regional Combatant Commanders are focused on the short term and 
could play a useful role in identifying and advocating short-term capability shortfalls, the 
other commands have enterprise-wide responsibilities and need to play a larger role in 
addressing longer-term capability requirements.  Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM), TRANSCOM, Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and JFCOM all have 
Service-like responsibilities and should be advocates for the capabilities they believe 
their successors will need ten to fifteen years in the future.  TRANSCOM, for example, 
has been made the “distribution process owner” for managing the entire supply chain.  
STRATCOM has responsibility for both Global C4ISR and the Global Strike mission.  
To be effective advocates for their perspective on long-term capability needs in a 
Pentagon-centric resource allocation process, the CoComs with enterprise-wide 
responsibilities may need a 3-star representative based in Washington.  The CoComs, for 
example, have a standing invitation to attend any meeting of the JROC.  On an 
experimental basis, perhaps JFCOM and STRATCOM could be added to the JROC as 
statutory members and become members of the SLRG when it addresses resource 
allocation matters.   
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• Build a strong Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation capable of providing 
independent analysis to the Secretary on broad strategic choices facing DoD. 
 
Over the past two decades, PA&E has focused on scrubbing individual programs 
rather than engaging in broader mission-area analysis.  Although there are indications 
that PA&E is starting to move in this direction as part of the Enhanced Planning Process, 
the Secretary needs a robust and independent analytic capability for addressing major 
strategic issues, if only to hedge against those occasions when there is too little jointness 
in the options generated for him by the Military Services and the Joint Staff.   PA&E, in 
addition to the EPP major issue process, should conduct annually a zero-based analysis, 
including rigorous risk assessments, of two to three joint capability areas that would 
identify joint capability shortfalls and provide options for decision by the Secretary. 
 
• Create an independent, continuous policy implementation/execution review 
process that is tied directly to the Secretary of Defense. 
 
Our concern that policy implementation and program execution are not receiving 
the attention they deserve is buttressed by our conviction that a year-end review is not 
sufficient in any case.  Too often, as seemed to be the case with reporting to comply with 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the reporting becomes a means of 
justifying DoD performance, rather than assessing it.  As onerous as the process is, DoD 
is much better at allocating resources than ensuring that the resources are spent in the 
manner they are intended. 
 
The Secretary needs a means for determining how well current policy is being 
implemented or current programs are being executed.  We believe he needs an Office of 
Implementation & Execution Review (I&ER) that could be housed in the Comptroller’s 
office.   This office would function as the executive secretary for SecDef bimonthly 
meetings of the SLRG that would receive reports from D/I&ER on real-time 
implementation and execution and responses from the relevant offices.  While this would 
involve an IG-like confrontation between the Secretary and the offices implementing his 
policy direction, it would provide the Secretary with a mechanism to ensure 
accountability and a means for organizational learning.  It would put teeth into 
performance-based management and move beyond annual GPRA reports.   
 
This office also would be responsible for gathering all authoritative and directive 
guidance (from the JPG, joint-capability area assessments, EPP, individual SecDef 
decisions, etc.) to establish a single, unified statement of the strategies, policies and 
programs to be followed, implemented and executed.  This would provide a clear 
standard to which all offices would be held accountable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Secretary Rumsfeld has moved aggressively during 2003 to improve the advocacy 
of joint capability needs in the resource allocation process.  The BG-N study team 
supports his reform efforts, but believes that the prospects for success would be enhanced 
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if new capacities, particularly in the Combatant Commands, were added to new 
responsibilities.  Moreover, a more robust and proactive PA&E could substantially 
increase the number of options available to the Secretary for addressing short- and long-
term capabilities gaps.  Finally, we believe that the Secretary should move more 
aggressively to strengthen policy implementation and execution review processes in 
DoD. 
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Chapter 6 
Procuring Joint Capabilities 
 
The Department of Defense has been struggling with the tension between 
preserving the institutional vitality of the Military Services and the need to extend and 
broaden jointness ever since the National Security Act of 1947 created the “national 
military establishment.”  With respect to the planning and conduct of military operations, 
Congress resolved this tension in favor of jointness when Goldwater-Nichols gave 
combatant command authorities to the Combatant Commander and made him the senior 
ranking military officer in the chain of command.  The U.S. military now fights as a joint 
team.   
 
Although the Military Services retain the Title 10 responsibilities to organize, 
train and equip, the fact that the U.S. military fights jointly has led to an evolution of 
jointness in all three of these Title 10 areas.  There are now over 35 joint task forces, a 
state of affairs never envisioned by Goldwater-Nichols.  The Military Services are 
straining to fill these joint assignments, as joint task force headquarters are deploying to 
Iraq with only 65-70 percent of the billets filled that have been validated by the joint 
manning documents.  The BG-N study team will address this issue in BG-N Phase 2.  
Although the recent pace of military operations has affected training, U.S. forces 
continue to perform superbly in the field.  Any “shortcomings” in joint training have 
clearly not resulted in the kinds of operational failures that led to Goldwater-Nichols. 
 
In the equip function, however, the Department of Defense continues to struggle 
with insufficient jointness.  Lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq underscore interoperability shortcomings in 
equipment fielded by the Military Services.  Of particular importance was the lack of 
standardized combat identification among the Services, a capability necessary to prevent 
fratricide.  This was particularly acute among most aircrews as they lacked electronic 
data links with friendly ground combat vehicles.16 Cumbersome deployment planning 
and execution equipment systems also failed to operate well together.  Insufficient 
information sharing and communications failures were also attributable to 
interoperability shortfalls.17  These interoperability problems did not result in significant 
operational failures, in large part due to the great initiative demonstrated by the joint team 
in developing workarounds.  It is also clear that attention paid to air-ground coordination 
failures in OEF paid handsome dividends during OIF. 
 
This enduring lack of jointness in how DoD procures weapons has both raised the 
cost of military operations (e.g., persistent interoperability problems cause friendly fire 
casualties) and constrained the growth of U.S. military capabilities (e.g., Services invest 
too much in duplicative capabilities and too little in Low Density / High Demand assets).  
The United States may be able to afford these capability losses against adversaries like 
the Taliban and Hussein regime, but not against the full range of 21st century challenges.     
                                                 
16 Sandra I. Erwin, “Close Air Support Tactics Sharpened in Iraq,” National Defense (June 03). 
17 General Tommy Franks, Prepared Testimony before House Armed Services Committee, July 10, 2003. 
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Recent Reform Efforts 
 
The extensive efforts by Secretary Rumsfeld to strengthen the advocacy of joint 
capabilities in the resource allocation process have been described and assessed in the 
previous chapter.  By pursuing this avenue, the Secretary has implicitly decided that 
resources should still be organized and managed along Service lines, a guiding principle 
for the BG-N study team.  The Military Services remain the best venue for balanced and 
integrated planning and should retain the primary role in defense procurement. 
 
Repeated failures over the past decade to develop common, interoperable C2 for 
joint operations, however, led the Secretary to make an exception to the general rule.  In 
Management Initiative Decision (MID) 912, the Secretary assigned responsibility to the 
Joint Forces Command to improve the integration and interoperability of C2 systems.  
MID 912 provided JFCOM the authority to review and approve all Joint Battle 
Management Command and Control (JMBC2) requirements and system-of-systems 
capability requirements to ensure integration and interoperability of these capabilities 
prior to entering the acquisition process.18   
 
In this role, JFCOM leads JBMC2 mission and capability area requirements to 
include:  concepts, integrated architectures, systems interoperability and integration 
efforts, training and experimentation to guide future systems acquisitions.19  JFCOM also 
serves as the joint force trainer, integrator and executive agent for experimentation to 
help inform the development of these requirements.  Finally, JFCOM established a 
JMBC2 Board, with representation from the Combatant Commands, the Military Services 
and the Joint Staff, to help it exercise its new authorities.  JFCOM also sought and 
received “limited acquisition authority” to field discrete command and control 
capabilities to the Combatant Commanders themselves. 
 
Assessment 
 
The BG-N study team does not believe the MID 912 approach will work.  In 
essence, JFCOM is following the same strategy – design an operational architecture, set 
interoperability standards and rely upon a steering committee consisting of general 
officers representing all of the stakeholders – that has been tried several times but has 
failed.  The office of the person responsible, namely JFCOM, is new, but the approach is 
not.  One JFCOM officer told the BG-N study team: “We are working hard on the 
symptoms of a completely dysfunctional problem.”  JFCOM estimated (in early 2004) 
that it would take about two years to develop and gain agreement on a JBMC2 
operational architecture and the supporting interoperability standards.  The OIF Lessons 
Learned study identified the lack of a common, interoperable C2 system as one of the 
                                                 
18 Admiral Giambastiani, USN, CDR JFCOM, Testimony before SASC, 14 March, 2003 
19 Brigadier General Marc Rogers, USAF, Testimony before HASC, 21 October 2003. 
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most critical capability shortfalls.  Waiting two years to see if JFCOM, unlike its 
predecessors, can build one from the ground up by consensus makes little sense.20   
 
In an age of global communications, providing joint, interoperable C2 is an 
enterprise-wide challenge.  In this area, organizing and managing resources along Service 
lines has not achieved real interoperability in joint C2.  Trying to build it from the 
“outside in” has led the Services, understandably, to give top priority to the “edges” 
where their systems operate, rather than the “center,” where all of the Service-provided 
capabilities must operate together.  DoD has tried to bridge the interoperability gaps by 
establishing standards and protocols but U.S. forces in the field, as seen in OEF and OIF, 
still have to improvise and build workarounds.  In making an exception to its principle 
that resources should be managed along Service lines, the BG-N study team now believe 
that the fundamental problem – the lack of joint, interoperable C2 – cannot be solved 
unless it is addressed directly.   
 
Recommendation  
 
• Convert the J-6 into the core of a department-wide, joint task force (with 
budgetary and acquisition authority) for Joint C2 
 
As DoD has done for special forces and missile defense, responsibility (and the 
associated Program Elements or PEs) should pass from the Military Services to the new 
joint C2 task force.  This military task force should be headed by a 3-star, namely the 
billet now held by J-6, to ensure sufficient organizational heft, and could be augmented 
by appropriate elements from DISA as determined by the Secretary of Defense upon the 
recommendation for the CJCS.   
 
The BG-N study team recognizes that it will be difficult to draw the boundary 
between the “core” C2 functions that will be the responsibility of the new joint C2 task 
force and the C2 interfaces and applications that will remain the responsibilities of the 
Military Services.  Notwithstanding these definitional problems, the BG-N study team 
believes that true interoperability in Joint C2 will not be achieved until it is bought 
jointly.  The new Under Secretary for C3I should provide policy oversight and advocacy 
in the Washington-centric resource allocation process.   As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
responsibility for operational planning for C4 could be assigned to a deputy J-3 for C4.   
                                                 
20 By assigning C2 to JFCOM but not Communications and Computers (the other two elements of C4), 
MID 912 may have created a new “seam” in the JS-centric JCIDS process.  Currently, there are separate 
Functional Capability Boards for C2 and Net Centric, with the latter being described as the communication 
links that tie all of the capabilities boards together.  Enabling effective command and control is the prime 
(although not only) requirement for any military communications system and is usually addressed as an 
integrated whole, namely C3.  Creating separate FCBs for C2 and the “other C2” (Communications and 
Computers, aka “Net Centric”) reflects the organizational structure created by MID 912, but creates a seam 
between command and control and the communications systems that enable it. 
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Conclusion 
  
Interoperable C2 is critical for the effective functioning of Joint Task Force 
headquarters.  As seen most recently in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 
the Military Services have made great strides in their ability to communicate with each 
other in the field.  During the first Gulf War, for example, the Air Force had to transport 
physically the daily air tasking order to the Navy carriers.  That degree of non-
interoperability is a thing of the past.  Members of the joint team have demonstrated great 
ingenuity in developing workarounds to overcome the failure of C2 systems to talk to 
each other.  In an era of effects-based operations, however, this energy and initiative 
should be applied to the objectives being sought by military operations, not simply to 
making the operations happen.  In order for interoperable joint C2 to be “born joint,” it 
appears it must be procured jointly. 
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 Chapter 7 
Strengthening Civilian Professionals in Defense and National Security 
 
Over the last two decades, numerous task forces, commissions, and study groups 
have sounded a clarion call to significantly reform, if not completely reshape, the U.S. 
civilian personnel system, be it in DoD, State, the intelligence agencies, or across the 
U.S. government as a whole.21  Perhaps none has been more blunt in its assessment of the 
shortfalls associated with the federal government’s human resource management than the 
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (commonly referred to as the “Hart-
Rudman Commission”), which declared in 2001 that, “[a]s it enters the 21st century, the 
United States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in 
government.”22   Others have echoed this sense of urgency, particularly with regard to 
DoD’s sclerotic and outdated human resources system.  Without fundamental reform, it 
has been argued, the “quality of DoD’s workforce is at stake, and that quality is one of 
the pillars of civilian control of the military.”23  Although the extent of the problem and 
the stakes for the nation are enormous, this looming crisis is largely unrecognized outside 
the Pentagon, so these calls for change have largely fallen on deaf ears. 
 
This critical issue could not be ignored in a study that aims to define priority areas 
for defense reform.  Therefore, this chapter focuses, first and foremost, on the question of 
how to strengthen the civilian career professionals in DoD.  How can the Department of 
Defense recruit the best and brightest civilians into its ranks, provide them with the 
incentives necessary to spend much of their careers in public service, and give them the 
professional development opportunities they need to support the Secretary of Defense in 
providing civilian stewardship of the U.S. military and making effective use of the armed 
forces in support of U.S. national security policies?   
 
This chapter also touches on the larger issue of how to create greater “jointness” 
at the interagency level.  How can we ensure that civilian professionals across the 
national security agencies have the skills they need to integrate all of the instruments of 
national power into effective national security strategies, policies, plans and operations; 
                                                 
21 A sample of the recent literature on civilian resource management includes the following:  
(i) U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: 
Imperative for Change, Phase III Report (February 2001); 
(ii) Defense Science Board Task Force, Human Resources Strategy (February 2000);  
(iii) The National Commission on the Public Service, Urgent Business for America:  Revitalizing 
the Federal Government for the 21st Century (January 2003)  
(iv) GAO Report, Senior Executive Service: Enhanced Agency Efforts Needed to Improve 
Diversity as the Senior Corps Turns Over (October 2003); 
(v) GAO Report, DoD Personnel: DoD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human Capital 
Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and Sourcing Decisions (March 
2003); and  
(vi) GAO Report, Human Capital:  DoD’s Civilian Personnel Strategic Management and the 
Proposed National Security Personnel System (May 2003). 
22 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for 
Change, Phase III Report (February 15, 2001), p. xiv.  
23 Ensuring Quality People in Defense, David S.C. Chu and John P. White, in Keeping the Edge: Managing 
Defense for the Future, Perry, William and Carter, Ashton B., eds. (Boston: MIT Press, May 2001). 
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adapt to a highly uncertain and rapidly changing security environment; and operate 
effectively not only in their home agencies but also in the interagency and international 
contexts? 
 
Recruiting the Best and Brightest  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has fallen on tough 
times in its ability to attract top-level talent to the career civil service.  The problem stems 
from multiple sources:  competition from private sector opportunities with often superior 
pay and fewer bureaucratic frustrations; complex and rigid hiring and security clearance 
procedures that can take months to complete; perceptions of government as a plodding 
bureaucracy where young talent lies fallow; and a changing labor market that 
increasingly views the notion of a single-employer career as undesirable and 
anachronistic.  Though many young Americans have felt called to public service by the 
events of September 11 and the war on terrorism, they still confront a government hiring 
process that is frustrating at best.  And once in government, they often complain of 
encrusted systems, needless hierarchy, and few opportunities for advancement to senior 
positions.   
 
The numbers, especially when compared to 1989, paint an alarming picture.  
When the Cold War ended, the Department of Defense began a process of refashioning 
its workforce, both military and civilian, to meet the very different demands of a new 
world.  In practice, this meant a series of decisions in the 1990s to downsize the force, 
through a combination of personnel cuts, retirement incentives and hiring freezes, and to 
outsource many non-core tasks to the private sector.24   One of the negative, and 
unintended, consequences of these changes was an increasingly aging civilian workforce 
in DoD.  There are 75% fewer personnel in their twenties and nearly 50% fewer in their 
thirties compared with 1989 figures, while the number in their fifties has remained 
constant.25  This age imbalance is further compounded by the fact that a bow wave of 
personnel, 58% of the current civilian workforce in DoD, will become eligible for early 
or regular retirement in the next two years.26  This aging demographic presents both a 
serious challenge and unique opportunity for renewal that senior leadership must address 
in the coming years.  Otherwise, the imperative of maintaining institutional expertise 
within the Defense Department and the broader national security establishment will be 
put in jeopardy.  
 
To meet this challenge, the Department of Defense needs to institute a more 
aggressive approach to recruiting and hiring quality civilians and a more flexible “in and 
out” system, where there are more incentives for talented personnel to move into and out 
of government.  Such mobility at the mid-career level could be particularly beneficial for 
bringing best business and management practices into the career civil service.  It is also 
crucial to attracting talented young people to government service. 
                                                 
24 Between fiscal years 1989 and 2002, DoD’s civilian workforce shrank from 1,075,437 to 670,166—
about a 38% reduction. 
25  Defense Science Board Task Force, Human Resources Strategy, pp. 37. 
26 See the GAO March 2003 Report, p. 5. 
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Retaining High Performers 
 
An explicit goal, and notable success, of the original Goldwater-Nichols Act was 
to create incentives for the military’s best and brightest to seek joint service, joint training 
and joint education.  Most noteworthy, the legislation stipulated professional military 
education and joint experience requirements for promotion to flag and general officer.  
Today, it is difficult to refute the notion that these personnel advancements helped to 
pave the way for the jointness achieved in America’s military operations in the 
intervening years.   
 
Unfortunately, there is no parallel set of incentives or requirements to encourage 
professional development for civilians in DoD or to broaden their experience base and 
skill set – whether education, training or interdepartmental and interagency rotations.    
Whereas the U.S. military personnel system strategically marshals, manages and 
maintains a high quality of uniformed officers because it views its people as assets whose 
value can be enhanced through investment, civilian human capital systems among the 
national security agencies simply do not adhere to this fundamental precept.  This reflects 
a general lack of appreciation for the critical roles that civilian professionals play in the 
Department of Defense and the national security agencies more broadly:  providing deep 
expertise, institutional memory, continuity across administrations, and seasoned 
perspectives on policies and programs. 
 
For example, in contrast to how training is viewed in the military context, many 
DoD civilians view training and professional education as a detour rather than a path to 
future advancement because the current civilian system does not consistently reward the 
acquisition of new skills.  Moreover, even where professional development programs and 
training courses for civilians are made available, many managers have a perverse 
incentive not to allow their best employees to pursue such opportunities because they 
lack the ability to quickly and easily fill the open billet with a person of similar talent.27  
In contrast to the U.S. military, where a 10-15 percent personnel “float” has enabled the 
Military Services to emphasize the education and training so crucial to 
professionalization and performance, the DoD civilian workforce has not been authorized 
any additional billets to enable professional education and training in its mid- and senior- 
level ranks.  As a result, the system often thwarts rather than encourages the sorts of 
education and training experiences that would meaningfully enhance the performance of 
its personnel. 
 
In addition, the current personnel system has no incentives or requirements for 
policy professionals to seek interagency, private sector, or international rotations over the 
                                                 
27 In FY1997 and 1998, respectively, the Defense Department created the Defense Leadership and 
Management Program (DLAMP) and the Policy Career Development Program (PCDP) to build a 
framework for developing civilians in the Department.  Inadequate funding and low enrollment levels for 
OSD employees have largely prevented these programs from flourishing.  See Chu and White, Ensuring 
Quality People in Defense, p. 232; see also DLAMP website at www.cpms.osd.mil/dlamp. The DLAMP 
program is described in DoD Directive 1430.16. 
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course of their careers, further contributing to parochialism within the ranks of civilian 
professionals in DoD (and other agencies).  For example, an OPM-conducted survey 
found that, throughout the entire federal government, only 9% of the Senior Executive 
Service (the leadership component of the civilian workforce) has worked in more than 
one agency, although nearly half (45%) think such mobility would substantially improve 
their job performance.28  No incentives, no requirements and inadequate resources to 
support external rotations starkly contrasts with how the careers of most military officers 
are managed. 
 
Furthermore, the aging of the DoD workforce and absence of an “up or out” 
culture has tended to clog the personnel system at the top, creating unnecessary 
management layers and limiting promotion opportunities for rising stars.  Promotions and 
plum assignments in some parts of the Department still too often are based on seniority as 
opposed to performance.  And the protections inherent in the civil service system have 
often limited the ability of managers to replace non-performers.  In addition, all of the 
senior management positions in DoD at the Assistant Secretary level or above are 
occupied by political appointees, limiting the opportunities for advancement available to 
even the most capable and experienced career professionals.   
 
This glass ceiling is not only real; it is virtually impenetrable.  It is also somewhat 
unique:  At both the State Department and the CIA, for example, one can find career 
professionals serving at the Undersecretary level.  What’s more, political appointees in 
the Pentagon also abound at lower levels, such as Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Deputy 
Undersecretaries, Office Directors and even action officers.  Not surprisingly, the 
retention rates for the best and brightest coming into the civil service in DoD and 
elsewhere are rather dismal: 75% of the Presidential Management Interns surveyed in 
2002 said they would leave government within 10 years.29   
 
Recommendations  
 
So what is to be done?  Many have hailed last year’s passage of the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS) as part of the 2003 defense appropriations package as 
the vehicle that will transform DoD’s civilian personnel system.  While the NSPS 
legislation does in fact give the Secretary of Defense significantly broadened latitude to 
manage and reshape the future of DoD’s civilian workforce (especially with respect to 
key elements such as hiring, compensation, promotion and job classification), it is too 
soon to evaluate the actual substance and strategic direction of this new system.30  The 
room to maneuver has been created, but it is not yet clear how or to what end these new 
authorities will be used.  It is, however, clear that substantial additional steps are needed 
                                                 
28 U.S. Office of Personnel Management and the Senior Executives Association, Survey of the Senior 
Executive Service, 1999.  Indeed, one of the benefits for members of the Senior Executive Service is to 
have a network of professional contacts across one’s own department and others.   
29 The National Commission on the Public Service:  Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st 
Century (January 2003).  In January 2003, the Presidential Management Internship (PMI) program was 
renamed the Presidential Management Fellowship (PMF) program. 
30 For more on the NSPS and its evolution in further detail, see its official website at 
www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps.   
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to attract, retain, motivate and reward a high-performing corps of civilian defense 
professionals.  
 
• Congress should establish a new Defense Professionals Corps to attract the best 
and brightest civilians to serve in DoD and to provide greatly expanded 
opportunities for professional development and career advancement. 
 
In the face of the coming retirement bow wave and currently poor retention rates 
for young professionals, the leadership of the Department of Defense needs to completely 
rethink and reform the way in which it manages and supports its career civilians. Absent 
a dramatic increase in recruiting, hiring, and retention, DoD could well face a personnel 
crisis within five years.  Like the Foreign Service, the Defense Professionals Corps would 
have a competitive entry process (similar to the current PMI program) designed to 
identify and attract the most talented young people considering government service.  In 
order to make this option even more attractive, Congress should significantly expand 
programs that provide support for graduate education in exchange for government 
service, such as the National Security Education Act and student loan forgiveness 
programs.  At the same time, DoD should revamp its recruiting efforts to be able to make 
on-the-spot job offers, pending a candidate being given the appropriate security 
clearances.  In addition, the process for granting and renewing security clearances should 
be streamlined and rationalized to reduce unnecessary and costly delays.  This could 
significantly reduce the time and costs involved in the hiring process. 
 
Early on, young professionals coming into the system would specialize in one of 
four areas: policy, finance and budget, personnel and readiness, or acquisition.31 
Although most would enter the new Corps at the entry level, the system should be 
designed to allow talented mid-career professionals with relevant experience outside 
government to join the DoD service.  It should also be designed to enable members of the 
Defense Professionals Corps to move in and out of government service over the course of 
their careers.  In this regard, Congress and OPM should reevaluate the ethics restrictions 
placed on DoD employees, particularly those below the rank of GS14, to enable DoD 
career civilians to gain valuable private sector and non-profit experience in the course of 
their professional development.  
 
Advancement in the Defense Professional Corps should be based on a clear set of 
requirements designed to develop civilian leaders, in all four areas specified above, 
capable of operating effectively not only within DoD but also in the interagency context.  
The early years of a Defense Professional’s (DP) career would be spent in his or her area 
of specialization (policy, finance and budget, personnel and readiness, or acquisition) 
within DoD.  Prior to selection for GS-15, DPs would have to complete one year of 
professional education focused on broader national security issues and interagency 
processes.  Before being selected for the Senior Executive Service (SES), DPs would also 
have to complete a 2-3 year rotation to another national security agency or abroad.  Prior 
to selection for SES-4, DPs would have to complete an additional rotation to another 
national security agency, abroad, or a relevant private sector entity.  In addition, DPs 
                                                 
31 Specialized technical and scientific personnel would be managed outside this system. 
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would be accorded regular opportunities for ongoing training in relevant subjects and 
skills throughout their careers.  Special Boards designed to manage the careers of 
personnel in the Defense Professional Corps would handle selection for education and 
training opportunities, rotations and promotions.   
 
This obviously would require Congress and the DoD to increase their level of 
investment in the professional development of the Department’s civilian professionals.  
The National Defense University would need to be tasked and resourced to develop a 
professional education curriculum on national security for Defense Professionals.  Senior 
leaders would have to commit time and energy to managing the system, including 
identifying rotation opportunities in other agencies and the private and non-profit sectors 
as well as serving on Boards that would determine who would be given opportunities for 
professional education and training, rotations, and promotion.   
 
Just as important, establishing a Defense Professionals Corps would require a 
fundamental change in the way we think about the career civilians who serve in the 
Department of Defense: as the name suggests, they would have to be seen, developed and 
treated as a corps of professionals.   
 
The returns on this investment would likely be substantial.  Such a Corps, with its 
attendant opportunities for professional development and advancement, would stand a 
much better chance of attracting the best and brightest graduates for service in DoD.  It 
would also stand a better chance of retaining them, especially if the system were made 
flexible enough to allow DPs to leave and reenter government service over the course of 
their careers.  Such a system also would promote the development of the kinds of 
management and leadership skills that DoD’s civilian professionals need to have to 
support DoD in its core missions and to cope with the dynamics of the post-9/11 
environment.  It also could plant seeds that, over time, could contribute to greater 
jointness at the interagency level. 
 
• The Secretary of Defense should create a “personnel float” over the next five 
years of approximately 1,000 career civilian billets (for GS-12 through SES) in 
OSD and the defense agencies to enable personnel to pursue the educational, 
training and rotation experiences required for promotion.    
 
If we want to be able to expect the same level of professionalism from DoD 
career civilians as we have come to expect from our military personnel, we must allocate 
the resources necessary to enable them to undertake a comparable and sustained program 
of professional development.  Congress allows the Military Services 10-15 percent 
additional endstrength to create a personnel “float” that is used to enable training, 
education and joint rotations as military professionals come up the ranks.  A similar 
approach is needed for civilian personnel in OSD and the defense agencies at the GS-12 
level and above to enable them to meet the professional development requirements 
outlined for the Defense Professional Corps.  Creating the headroom for professional 
development could be accomplished by either reducing the number of civilian billets 
while maintaining current personnel levels or increasing the personnel endstrength -- 
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1,000 additional billets would cost about $90 million -- or some combination of each.32  
This is a small price to pay for a meaningful increase in the performance and 
professionalism of the Department’s career civilians and would be partially offset by 
endstrength reductions resulting from the organizational consolidations recommended in 
previous chapters.   
 
• Working with Congress, the Secretary of Defense should create additional 
opportunities for advancement in order to retain DoD’s high performing career 
professionals.  
 
Specifically, the Secretary of Defense and the President should begin by opening 
up more senior positions in the Department to career civilians.  Currently, virtually all of 
the senior positions (DASD and above) in DoD are held by political appointees.  This 
contrasts significantly with the State Department, for example, where career Foreign 
Service Officers can be found at the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary and 
Undersecretary levels.  In order to enable the most seasoned defense professionals to 
assume positions of greater responsibility commensurate with their experience – and in so 
doing, retain the best personnel -- the growth in the number of political appointees within 
DoD should be reversed over time.  As a start, future Secretaries of Defense should 
attempt to fill as many Principal Deputy Undersecretary and Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary positions as possible with qualified career civil servants in order to create more 
room at the top for civilian professionals while also taking advantage of their years of 
experience and institutional memory.  Admittedly, developing and retaining career 
professionals who can serve at senior levels and giving them the opportunities to do so is 
a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem.  However, as the quality of civilian professionals 
improves with greater investment in their professional development, more will be 
competitive to serve at senior levels, and as this occurs, more should be afforded the 
opportunity to do so. 
 
The Secretary also should work with Congress to create a modified “up-or-out 
system” with additional incentives for early retirement or voluntary separation for non-
performing career civilians in order to create more room at the top for high-performers.  
This would involve building on the pay banding and performance-based pay approach 
authorized in the NSPS.  Congress should provide full funding for the SecDef to use the 
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP) authority recently made a permanent SecDef 
prerogative in the NSPS bill.  It should also provide the SecDef with the authority to offer 
Voluntary Early Retirement as a means of encouraging poor performers to leave 
government service.   
 
                                                 
32 Estimate based on September 2003 DoD employment statistics as set forth at 
http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.htm. 
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• In order to foster greater jointness at the interagency level, Congress, working 
with the Office of Personnel Management, should establish a new promotion 
requirement for all civilian professionals in the national security agencies:  
appointment to the career Senior Executive Service in any national security 
agency would require a 2-3 year rotation in another national security agency. 
 
 One of the most profound changes made in the original Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation was the creation of the Joint Service Officer designation and the associated 
incentives for officers in the U.S. military to seek joint service as a way of advancing 
their careers.  Once joint service became a virtual requirement for promotion to Flag or 
General Officer, the best and brightest in each of the Services began to actively seek joint 
assignments.  This cross-fertilization across the Military Services created the human and 
cultural foundation on which increasingly integrated joint military operations have been 
built over the last 18 years.  Jointness began as a change of experience that begat a 
change of mindset and behavior. 
 
 But there is no comparable system of incentives and requirements to encourage 
interagency rotations among civilian professionals across the national security agencies.  
Quite the contrary:  rotations out of one’s home agency are often viewed as the kiss of 
death for one’s upward mobility.  In an era in which purely military operations are 
becoming an endangered species and interagency operations abound, we need to plant the 
seed of jointness in the interagency context by creating incentives that reward interagency 
experience. 
 
Building on the success of the Joint Service Officer program established by the 
original Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Congress should work with OPM to establish a 
similar incentive structure to encourage civil servants in agencies that play a key role in 
national security -- Defense, State, AID, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy, CIA, and 
Homeland Security -- to gain interagency expertise and experience.33  Better integrating 
the plans, policies and operations of these agencies requires a human resources approach 
that would expand opportunities to gain interagency experience and would reward those 
who seek broad-based, integrative approaches to problem solving.34   
 
Making promotion to SES (or equivalent) as a career professional contingent 
upon spending a 2-3 year rotation in another agency would likely turn the prevailing 
attitude toward interagency rotations on its head:  Rather than being seen as a distraction 
from, if not a detriment to, advancement in one’s home agency, it would be seen as the 
most important ticket to punch for promotion.  This requirement would be administered 
by OPM in partnership with the individual Departments, which would maintain control 
over the selection, assignment and promotion of their own personnel.   Over time, this 
might provide the basis for developing something akin to a National Security 
                                                 
33 It should also consider providing incentives for Senior Executives to become more deployable for 
complex operations, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
34 Hart-Rudman Commission Phase III Report, p. 101. 
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Professionals Corps, which would seek to create a cadre of civilian professionals expert 
in national security and interagency management.35 
  
Conclusion   
 
 It is often said that the superior performance of the U.S. military derives from the 
superior quality of its people – a quality that is borne of the Services’ ability to recruit 
highly talented individuals, invest in their professional development, and entice many of 
its top performers to make military service their profession. Given the central roles that 
civilian professionals play in the Department of Defense and the national security 
agencies more broadly, our goal should be to be able to say the same about them.  
Unfortunately, this goal cannot be reached via gentle tweaks to the existing system.  The 
system is badly broken and fundamental reform is necessary.  The recommendations 
above are not radically new or experimental ideas.  Rather they are rooted in and modeled 
on the proven success of the reforms to military personnel management that were made in 
the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation.  Given the looming crisis in DoD’s civilian 
personnel system, now is the time to extend these reforms to the military’s closest 
civilian partners. 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid, p. 102. 
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 Chapter 8 
Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations 
 
The past decade of experience in complex contingency operations, from Somalia 
to Iraq, has demonstrated that success requires unity of effort not only from the military 
but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition.  In most cases, 
however, such unity of effort has proved elusive.  Time and time again, the United States 
and its international partners have failed to fully integrate the political, military, 
economic, humanitarian and other dimensions into a coherent strategy for a given 
operation – sometimes with disastrous results.   
 
In Somalia, the absence of an integrated strategy for achieving our objectives 
eventually yielded the battle of Mogadishu and the untimely withdrawal of the United 
States and the United Nations from the country.  In Afghanistan, the failure to provide 
adequate international military and police forces to create a secure and stable 
environment and adequate civilian capabilities to jumpstart reconstruction has put the 
country’s political transition at risk. In Iraq, the failure to plan adequately for post-
conflict operations allowed a security vacuum to develop that cost the U.S.-led coalition 
dearly – in time, credibility with the Iraqi people, and lives lost.  And in nearly every 
operation from Somalia to Iraq, a lack of rapidly deployable civilian capabilities has left 
military forces performing tasks for which they do not have a comparative advantage and 
has extended the duration of their deployments.  The failure to integrate strategy and 
develop needed capabilities for these operations has been one shared, to a greater or 
lesser degree, by every administration in recent memory. 
 
Yet there have been instances in which greater unity of effort has been achieved.  
Lessons learned from Somalia motivated U.S. planners for Haiti to initiate the first-ever 
pol-mil plan – an effort to harmonize the efforts of all of the U.S. agencies involved in 
the Haiti intervention.  This approach later became enshrined in Presidential Decision 
Directive 56 on Managing Complex Contingency Operations (PDD-56), which was 
signed by President Clinton in 1997 and used to better integrate strategy and planning for 
Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and other operations.36 Although the Bush administration 
drafted its own presidential guidance that captured many of the lessons learned from the 
1990s, the document was never signed.37   As a result, its tenets did not inform the 
planning and conduct of operations in either Afghanistan or Iraq, and both lacked an 
integrated strategy for post-conflict operations.  
 
In the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment, it is likely that future 
operations will be both interagency and international in character, requiring a high degree 
of integration and coordination.  Many will involve high stakes for the United States, 
touching important if not vital national interests, influencing foreign perceptions of U.S. 
leadership and credibility, and risking American lives and treasure.  In short, we will 
continue to face this challenge, and doing so demands that we extend our notion of 
“jointness” beyond the Military Services to the interagency and coalition levels. 
                                                 
36 See PDD-56 White Paper, at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc2.html. 
37 The unsigned National Security Policy Directive is known as NSPD “ XX.”  
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 This chapter aims to identify some of the key factors that have contributed to poor 
interagency and coalition performance in past operations, and makes concrete, actionable 
recommendations to build the U.S. government’s capacity for developing more integrated 
strategies and plans, and for conducting more integrated operations.38  It also offers 
several ways to improve coordination mechanisms for coalition operations.  These 
recommendations obviously go far beyond the bounds of defense reform, but they are 
nevertheless essential to the future success of the U.S. military.  Because the U.S. 
military will rarely operate outside the interagency and coalition contexts, its unmatched 
capabilities to win wars will be squandered if the United States and the international 
community more broadly do not also develop the capabilities needed to win the peace.   
 
The Problem 
 
Several factors have contributed to the less-than-stellar performance of the U.S. 
government in recent operations.  Unlike the military, which has doctrine and a standard 
approach to planning operations, the U.S. government as a whole lacks established 
procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans.  Each new administration tends 
to reinvent this wheel, issuing new guidance on how strategy development and planning 
is to be done, often overlooking the best practices of and lessons learned by its 
predecessors.  Some administrations have ignored the issue entirely until they confronted 
an actual crisis to which they had to respond.  This ad hoc approach has thwarted 
institutional learning and often hindered performance.   
 
In addition, there is no “planning culture” outside the Department of Defense.  
Whereas military officers are taught to see planning as critical to success in operations 
and trained in its finer points, this notion is largely foreign to other agencies like the 
Departments of State and Treasury.  With the exception of the Agency for International 
Development (AID), which plans long-term development projects, the civilian agencies 
tend not to have dedicated planning staffs or expertise.   
 
Furthermore, there is little capacity on the National Security Council staff 
dedicated to integrating agency strategies and plans or monitoring their execution, even 
though both functions are critical to achieving unity of effort across the U.S. government 
and success on the ground.  This state of affairs is an understandable but unfortunate 
legacy of the Oliver North era, when an NSC staffer strayed into the dangerous territory 
of conducting foreign operations from the Old Executive Office Building.  Since that 
time, NSC involvement in the conduct of operations has become a third rail in American 
foreign policy.   
 
While it remains true that lead responsibility for the planning and conduct of 
operations should rest with individual agencies, it also is true that the NSC staff has a 
critical role to play in leading an interagency process to develop an integrated strategy 
and a coherent U.S. game plan.  Leaving this integration function to a lead agency, which 
                                                 
38 A broader look at fundamentally reorganizing the U.S. government to deal with the national security 
challenges of the 21st Century is needed but beyond the scope of this Phase I report. 
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has no authority over its counterparts and cannot bring the President’s authority to bear, 
has been tried in the past but rarely works, as was most recently demonstrated when 
President Bush gave the lead to DoD for planning for post-conflict operations in Iraq.  A 
strong NSC role as integrator is necessary to counteract agency parochialism, identify 
potential disconnects and synergies, and elevate contentious issues to the Deputies and 
Principals for decision, preferably before American lives and treasure are on the line.39   
 
Another source of poor U.S. performance in complex operations is the lack of 
rapidly deployable experts and capabilities in most civilian agencies.40  Most civilian 
agencies do not focus on the conduct of operations and therefore lack an operational 
culture.  Consequently, even though these agencies may be tasked with performing 
critical tasks in a particular operation, they generally lack personnel who are trained and 
ready for these missions as well as the authorities and resources to rapidly deploy them 
and to quickly establish programs in the field.41  In practice, this means that the U.S. 
military has few civilian partners on the ground in the opening months of an operation.  
This can be a recipe for both mission creep, as military personnel are pressed to step into 
the vacuum and conduct tasks for which they are ill-suited or ill-prepared, and longer 
deployments, as milestones that will ultimately enable their exit strategy take longer to 
achieve. 
 
Finally, there are no standardized mechanisms for coordinating the planning and 
conduct of complex operations among coalition partners.  The lack of jointness at the 
international level is even greater than at the interagency level.  Here again, consultation 
and coordination mechanisms tend to be reinvented for every new operation, often with 
little regard for lessons learned or best practices from previous experiences.  While some 
of this is understandable given the range of forms an international intervention may take -
- from a UN operation, to an operation led by NATO or another regional organization, to 
a coalition of the willing led by a particular nation – more can and should be done to 
identify what has (and has not) worked in the past and to strengthen mechanisms for 
international coordination in the future. 
 
Given the nature of the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment, the 
demand for the United States and its international partners to conduct complex operations 
that require the integration of political, military, economic, humanitarian and other 
dimensions will likely continue.  Although the purpose and rationale for these operations 
will undoubtedly vary – from preventing the use of WMD to fighting terrorism, 
rebuilding failed states, preventing genocide and more – they invariably will demand a 
                                                 
39 The Bush White House move in October 2003 to set up the “Iraq Stabilization Group” under the control 
of the national security advisor appeared to be at least a tacit acknowledgement that the NSC staff needed 
to assume a more central and assertive role in coordinating post-conflict reconstruction operations in Iraq.     
40 The most well-known and laudable exception to this is AID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, 
which rapidly deploys Disaster Assistance Response (DART) teams to coordinate the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance. 
41 Anecdotal evidence suggests that most U.S. career civilians, from both the Departments of Defense and 
State, who have gone to Iraq to serve under the auspices of the Coalition Provisional Authority, have done 
so voluntarily and were not mandated by their home agencies.  Most tours for civilians have ranged from 
90 to 120 days, a relatively short timeframe that disrupts vital continuity in the theatre of operations. 
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level of jointness at the interagency and coalition levels that we currently lack the 
capacity to achieve.  Improving our performance in the conduct of these operations is not 
simply a matter of becoming more efficient or even more effective at the margins; it is a 
matter of whether or not we will be able to achieve our national security objectives at 
acceptable levels of cost and risk in the future. 
 
Recommendations 
 
In order to achieve greater unity of effort and success in future complex 
operations, the administration and the Congress should take a number of concrete steps to 
meaningfully increase the U.S. government’s capacity to develop strategy for, plan for 
and conduct integrated operations.   
 
• The President should designate a Deputy Assistant to the President on the NSC 
Staff as having lead responsibility for integrating agency strategies and plans 
and ensuring greater unity of effort among agencies during execution, and 
should establish a new NSC office with this mandate.   
 
In this capacity, the Deputy Assistant to the President for Stability Operations 
would co-chair all Deputies Committee meetings related to responding to international 
crises and would be supported by a new NSC office for Stability Operations.42  This new 
office would be responsible for developing policy direction to guide agency operational 
planning, reviewing and integrating agency plans for complex operations, helping to 
resolve differences or gaps between agency plans prior to execution, and monitoring the 
implementation of plans as an operation unfolds.  For every stability operation being 
considered, this Deputy Assistant to the President should establish an Interagency Crisis 
Action Team including the relevant NSC regional and functional Senior Directors as well 
as the relevant Undersecretary or Assistant Secretaries from agencies likely to be 
involved in the operation.  The Deputy Assistant to the President should be given the staff 
and resources to be able to support at least three interagency Crisis Action Teams 
simultaneously. Ideally, a core of this staff would remain in place as administrations 
change to provide continuity. 
 
• Each President, early in his or her tenure, should review the guidance 
establishing standard operating procedures for the planning of complex 
operations.    
 
 This guidance should articulate: an interagency division of labor, specifying 
which agencies should be prepared to lead or support others in various task areas; the 
mechanisms and process that will be used to integrate interagency planning, such as 
Interagency Crisis Action Teams or Executive Committees and a standard planning 
paradigm, including a template for a pol-mil plan, when and how interagency rehearsals 
                                                 
42 Similar proposals have been made in The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Play to Win, 
January 2003, available at http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/playtowin.pdf and in legislation introduced by 
Senators Lugar and Biden entitled, “The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 
2004,” which is reprinted in the February 25, 2004 Congressional Record. 
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will be conducted, and so forth.  Each administration should seek to the maximum extent 
possible to build on the lessons learned and best practices of its predecessor. 
 
• The Secretaries of all agencies likely to be involved in complex operations 
abroad should establish their own planning offices to lead the development of 
agency plans and participate in the interagency planning process.   
 
Congress should provide the authorities and resources for additional personnel for 
this purpose. At a minimum, new planning offices with approximately 10-12 people each 
should be created in the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce and Justice.  
 
• For each operation, the President should designate one senior official to be in 
charge of and accountable for integrating U.S. interagency operations on the 
ground.   
 
In some cases, this senior official will be the U.S. Ambassador to the host 
country.  In many cases, however, the United States may not have an Ambassador in 
country.43  In that case, a “Special Representative of the President” (SRP) should be 
appointed and charged with leading interagency operations on the ground once major 
combat operations have ceased.  He or she would be supported by a staff of agency 
detailees and other experts mobilized for the operation (see below).  (During combat 
operations, lead responsibility in the field would obviously rest with the military chain of 
command.)  In the case of a U.S.-led coalition operation, the SRP would also lead the 
coalition effort in the field.  If the United States were participating in an operation led by 
the UN, NATO, or another nation, the SRP would be the principal civilian U.S. 
interlocutor with the UN SRSG, senior NATO representative or the senior representative 
of the lead nation.   
 
In order for this Special Representative to be able, on behalf of the President, to 
bring the full range of U.S. capabilities to bear in a timely manner, Congress should give 
the President more flexible funding authorities for such operations, such as, 
notwithstanding authority for the provision of assistance to respond to crises, a flexible 
and replenishing emergency account for stability operations, and more flexible 
contracting and procurement procedures to jump-start reconstructions more rapidly on the 
ground.44 
 
• Congress should establish a new Agency for Stability Operations, with a 
Civilian Stability Operations Corps (CSOC) and Reserve, that is charged with: 
assessing and preparing for stability operations; organizing, training and 
equipping civilian capabilities for such operations; and rapidly deploying 
civilian experts and teams to the field.  
 
                                                 
43 Recent examples include Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
44 See, for example, the new funding mechanisms described in the 2004 SARCMA legislation noted above. 
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The Agency for Stability Operations would be an independent agency, with its 
own operations-oriented culture, that would report directly to the Secretary of State.45  Its 
principal functions would be to: monitor and assess crises that could result in U.S. 
involvement in stability operations; plan for the non-military aspects of such operations; 
participate in the development of interagency plans for stability operations; catalogue 
non-military capabilities and resources within the U.S. government that could be used in 
such operations; establish standing mechanisms, such as Memoranda of Understanding 
with other agencies and contract vehicles for certain types of services, to enable the rapid 
deployment of U.S. civilians to operations; establish and manage a Civilian Stability 
Operations Corps of 200-300 USG civilians who are organized, trained and equipped to 
conduct stability operations; oversee the establishment and maintenance of a Civilian 
Stability Operations Reserve of civilian experts outside government, in areas ranging 
from the holding of elections to the rebuilding of infrastructure, who agree to be “on call” 
for rapid deployment overseas; interface with relevant international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and foreign partners; and mobilize civilian personnel for 
deployment to operations, including providing staff support to the President’s Special 
Representative in the field.46   
 
Congress should provide this new agency with the authorities and resources 
necessary to support deployment of civilian teams to the field within days or weeks. One 
important aspect of this is ensuring that the President and his Cabinet Secretaries have the 
authorities they need to send selected civilian personnel to operations on a non-volunteer 
basis.  Congress and OPM should consider creating new incentives, such as enhanced pay 
and retirement benefits, for civilian professionals who are willing to sign up in advance to 
be available for deployment to operations abroad.  
 
• Congress should create a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition 
Operations.   
 
This Training Center should be given the following key missions:   
 
• Training NSC and agency personnel in integrated planning for complex 
contingencies; 
• Providing pre-deployment training to interagency personnel tapped for 
specific operations; 
• Training new officials coming into posts with responsibilities for operational 
planning and/or oversight; 
                                                 
45 One alternative considered was to reform USAID to perform this function, but the bureaucratic and 
cultural barriers to doing so seemed insurmountable.  Another was to put these functions in a new office in 
the State Department; this was rejected primarily out of concern that the State Department lacks the 
operational culture required for this new entity to be successful.  A third option was to create a new White 
House office to perform these functions, but this idea ran afoul of the general disinclination to involve the 
White House directly in the conduct of operations. 
46 Both Play to Win and the SARCMA legislation makes a number of similar proposals. 
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• Developing and certifying a cadre of civilian experts (including CSOC 
personnel and reservists) who could be called on to participate in future 
operations;  
• Hosting international training sessions and exercises that would include U.S. 
civilian and military personnel as well as their counterparts from allied and 
partner countries to develop standard operating procedures for the planning 
and conduct of complex operations; and 
• Collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices, 
including providing fellowships to enable senior personnel just returning from 
the field to capture and share their lessons learned with others. 
 
To ensure an interagency perspective and to maximize participation by both military and 
civilian professionals, the Training Center should be jointly run by DoD’s National 
Defense University and the State Department’s National Foreign Affairs Training Center. 
 
• The Secretaries of Defense, State and other departments should enhance 
peacetime opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with their 
counterparts from various countries. Congress should provide funding for these 
programs.   
 
Such contacts and exchanges are critical to developing an understanding of 
partner approaches to and capacities for complex operations and, over time, establishing a 
set of standard operating procedures for planning and coordination.  Such opportunities 
could include: establishing the equivalent of the military-to-military exchanges for 
civilian planners with their counterparts in key coalition states or multilateral 
organizations like the UN and NATO; recruiting representatives from U.S. allies and 
likely coalition partners to participate in relevant U.S. education and training programs, 
rehearsals and exercises, and seeking to be included in theirs as well; and increasing the 
number of international liaison officers working in USG offices involved in planning, 
oversight and execution of operations as well as the number of U.S. liaison officers in 
similar offices abroad. 
 
• Congress should fund two international training and exercise programs to 
develop and institutionalize standard operating procedures for the planning and 
conduct of operations involving U.S. civilian and military personnel and their 
foreign counterparts.   
 
The first program should target civilian and military planners at the headquarters 
level and should aim to establish civil-military mechanisms for coordinating planning 
among allies or coalition partners for a particular operation.  The second program should 
involve field-level operators and should aim to refine civil-military coordination 
mechanisms for the coalition on the ground, based on best practices from past operations.  
Both of these programs could be hosted by the Interagency Training Center described 
above and both should be ongoing activities to ensure that the United States has a 
standing vehicle for establishing and refining SOPs for integrated operations with its 
allies and coalition partners. 
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• Congress should increase U.S. funding for programs that support building the 
operational capabilities of allies and partners in priority task areas in complex 
operations.   
 
It is in U.S. interests to help its allies and potential coalition partners to enhance 
the capabilities they can bring to bear in complex operations, especially in areas where 
the United States does not have a comparative advantage or cannot afford to fill the need 
by itself.  This could include, for example, increasing U.S. funding for the training and 
equipping of international civilian police as well as constabulary and peacekeeping forces 
from other countries.  It might also include supporting the development of deployable 
civilian teams expert in areas ranging from justice reform and rule of law to civil 
administration. 
 
Conclusion  
 
For years, the United States has underinvested in the civilian capabilities needed 
to partner with its military forces to achieve success in complex operations.  It also has 
failed to institutionalize the mechanisms needed to integrate both U.S. government efforts 
and international efforts in complex operations.  Some feared that creating such 
capabilities would make it easier for the United States to get involved in “nation-
building.”  Others simply did not see this is a high priority.   
 
In the wake of September 11th, however, the link between failed states and global 
terrorism is widely recognized:  If the international community ignores failed and failing 
states, they may well become safe havens for terrorists who operate against us, as in the 
case of Afghanistan.  In addition, the Iraq war has served to remind us that post-conflict 
reconstruction operations are an inherent part of warfare.  However “decisive” the 
combat phase of a war, it will invariably stop short of achieving our broader strategic 
objectives.  In other words, decisive military operations may be necessary to achieve our 
objectives, but they are rarely if ever sufficient.  To get to the final goal, one needs 
follow-on civil-military operations to win the peace.   
 
These two facts – that we will likely find it in our interests to deal with failed or 
failing states in the future and that post-conflict operations are an intrinsic rather than 
optional part of winning a war -- suggest that it is high time the United States develop 
and institutionalize the civilian and military capabilities it needs to be successful in such 
complex operations.  This will require some significant investment – both political and 
financial – on the part of both the Congress and future Presidents, but compared to the 
costs of failing to improve our performance in future operations, such an investment is 
small and well worth it.   
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Chapter 9 
Strengthening Congressional Oversight 
 
The U.S. Congress is the place where ideas become the nation’s plans and 
commitments.  Yet, diminishing expertise and few truly national debates in Congress 
prevents an enduring foundation for new directions, including significant defense reform.  
The BG-N study team believes that it is critical to the health of both institutions to 
strengthen Congressional oversight of the Department of Defense.  
 
Over the past year, the BG-N study team has consulted numerous currently 
serving high-ranking officials from the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as a 
number of distinguished retired Senators and House members and staffers and former 
senior DoD officials, including several former Secretaries of Defense, to assess the 
current state of Congressional oversight and to discuss possible remedial steps.  We 
appreciate the candor with which these individuals shared their views and their genuine 
interest in identifying strategies aimed at improving Congressional oversight as well as 
enhancing cooperation and comity between the two branches, more broadly. 
 
 Practically all agree that there has been a significant and disturbing degree of 
erosion in the quality and structure of Congressional oversight of the Department in 
recent years, particularly by the two defense authorizing committees (the House and 
Senate Armed Services Committees). 
 
 A small number contend that the erosion in effective oversight by the defense 
authorization committees is not a problem at all, in that the absence of aggressive 
oversight means “fewer hassles” for the Department.  This is a shortsighted view.  
Congress is the indispensable link to the American people, the “connective tissue” 
between our national leaders and policies.  The ability to develop and sustain a modern 
and capable military establishment is dependent upon the support and consent of the 
American people and their elected representatives in Congress. 
 
In fact, the Department benefits considerably from serious questioning of its 
plans, policies, and programs by the Congress.  As noted in the report issued by the Hart-
Rudman Commission, “The objections raised by differing Congressional opinions can 
refine policy by forcing the administration to respond to previously unconsidered 
concerns…Congress can force the President and his top aides to articulate and explain 
administration policy – so the American people and the world can better understand it.”47  
 
The Problem 
 
 Effective Congressional oversight of the Defense Department is critically 
important to the nation’s ability to identify and defeat extant and emerging threats to our 
security and that of our friends and allies across the globe, and to organize and fashion a 
defense establishment that is both efficient and agile.  At present, however, Congress is 
                                                 
47 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for 
Change, Phase III Report (February 2001), p. xx. 
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engaged in too much of the wrong kind of oversight – too few national debates on major 
issues and far too much time and energy being spent on relatively minor and parochial 
issues.  
 
The defense authorizing committees today have less stature and wield less 
influence than at any time in recent memory.  For example, despite the enormous amount 
of time devoted to reviewing the Department’s annual budget requests, the authorizing 
committees are largely irrelevant to the budget process.  In recent years, the HASC and 
SASC typically have concluded their conference committee deliberations long after the 
defense appropriations subcommittees have completed work on the Defense spending bill 
for the next fiscal year.  Thus, the defense authorization conference reports have simply 
“carried” the amount of funding for most line items and accounts set by the defense 
appropriations subcommittees. 
 
Those same defense authorization conference reports have grown in size, scope 
and complexity.  The Congressional Research Service reports that in 1960, the annual 
defense bill had 11 pages.  Two decades later, it was 186 pages long.  The most recently 
enacted defense authorization conference report (for FY2004) was 898 pages long, with 
literally hundreds of provisions that impact practically every aspect of the Department’s 
business.  Ironically, legislating this level of detail –  “focusing on the capillaries” as one 
analyst put it – has actually reduced Congress’s clout, not accentuated it, according to 
most observers. 
 
Unfortunately, the committees have devoted only a modest amount of time to 
reviewing proposed far-reaching changes to the Department’s overall management 
structure and responsibilities, considering major changes in the global military force 
posture and basing, assessing the “lessons learned” from recent combat operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and the global war on terror, and other “big picture” issues that clearly 
warrant detailed review and attention.   
  
 What accounts for this degradation in the stature and authority of the defense 
authorizing committees and the general decline in the effectiveness of Congressional 
oversight?  A number of institutional and other factors have contributed to the overall 
problem.  First, the size of the defense oversight committees has grown remarkably.  
Today there are 61 members of the HASC (one-in-seven members of the House) and 23 
members of the SASC (nearly one-in-four members of the Senate).  The HASC in 
particular is simply too large to function effectively.  At the same time, there has been a 
remarkable turnover in membership on the defense authorizing committees.  Since the 
end of the Cold War, there has been a general decline in the cachet associated with 
serving on committees that deal with national security matters.  Members who have a 
military base or a major defense industrial plant in their district are likely to actively seek 
an assignment on a defense committee; more often than not, however, that member will 
focus on the needs of that base or the weapon system produced by that plant, rather than 
on broader national issues. 
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Secondly, there has been a steady decrease in the last decade or so in the number 
of members of Congress with military experience and expertise in national security 
topics.  World War II veterans (“the greatest generation”) are passing from the scene.  In 
1980, 240 House members had military experience; today, there are half that many (121), 
according to the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Quarterly and the 
American Legion. 
 
Third, members are assigned to four, five and sometimes six subcommittees, each 
of which typically meets on Wednesday morning or afternoon.  Because of the competing 
demands on their time, members spend less time on a particular committee or 
subcommittee assignment than he or she might otherwise prefer.  Moreover, a truncated 
workweek has reduced the amount of time that members spend in Washington.  In the 
House, for example, members can expect to cast recorded votes on the House floor 
beginning Tuesday late afternoon or evening and to return to their districts late Thursday 
evening or Friday morning.  So most members today fly home on Thursday and return to 
Washington on Tuesday night, producing effectively a 2½-day workweek.  This 
abbreviated schedule – which was designed to give members more time to attend to 
constituent interests back in their home district – has had a negative impact on the ability 
of members to become expert in a given topic, including defense issues. 
 
Fourth, the marked growth in the size of Congressional staffs has led to 
specialization.  As a former Deputy Secretary of Defense noted, “the larger the staffs, the 
smaller the issues they go after.”  As the size of the defense committee staffs have grown, 
committee chairmen, with a few exceptions, have failed to ensure that a significant 
percentage of staff effort and attention is devoted to broader national policy issues and 
concerns.   
 
Fifth, the growth in the size of other Congressional institutions devoted to 
overseeing Departmental programs and activities have led to blurred jurisdiction.  
Members have at their fingertips several organizations responsible for advising the 
Legislative branch on various matters (including national defense), such as the 
Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, and the Congressional 
Budget Office.  At any one time, literally dozens (if not hundreds) of audits, reviews, 
investigations, and assessments of the Department’s programs and activities are 
underway by these entities.  The ready availability of this panoply of investigative bodies 
tends to reinforce the instinct to look at micro issues versus the “big picture.”  In addition, 
there is a set of less official “institutions” that can play a big role in influencing 
Congressional decision-making on specified topics.  Quasi-official entities, such as the 
Depot Caucus, provide highly specialized channels for special interests.  The Department 
develops integrated plans, but these entities are dedicated to maximizing the value to 
subsection elements.   
 
In a similar vein, practically every Congressional committee now claims some 
degree of jurisdiction over one or more aspects of the Department’s activities.  A partial 
listing of such committees includes:  the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, 
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Budget 
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Committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, the House International Relations Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee and the Senate Commerce Committee, and the House and Senate 
Small Business Committees.  This diffusion of effort results in less clout for the 
legitimate oversight committees and consumes enormous amounts of time and attention 
of senior Department officials. 
 
Another contributory factor is the general reluctance of many members to 
challenge the authority of the commander-in-chief on military matters, especially when 
the chief executive is a member of their political party.  Additionally, there has been a 
reluctance of the Executive branch, and especially the Department of Defense, to insist 
upon and facilitate a discussion and debate of major, national-level policy matters.  
 
Further complicating matters is the perceived truth that Congress is unable to say 
“no” to constituents and interest groups who vie for an opportunity to receive federal 
funds for their particular program, cause, or activity.  The most obvious example here is 
so-called “pork” projects – projects of varying degrees of justification for which funding 
was not requested by the Administration in the proposed budget.  A more important and, 
over the long term potentially more debilitating, trend is the establishment of more and 
more “entitlements” or “unfunded mandates” for certain groups and individuals. The 
funds required to implement these new mandates/entitlements are substantial and will 
crowd out resources for needed modernization and transformation. 
 
 Finally, one cannot underestimate the impact the end of the Cold War has had on 
Congressional oversight.  Today there is no overarching military challenge or guiding 
principle that disciplines the process.  Without a unifying threat or theme, it is difficult to 
evaluate and prioritize any one proposed add-on over another.    
 
Relations between Congress and DoD 
 
 The decline in Congressional oversight has clearly contributed to deteriorating 
relations between Congress and DoD.  Although no one we interviewed suggested that 
the relationship had gone so far awry as to call into question the ability of the separate 
branches to carry out their respective duties as enumerated in the Constitution, or to act 
expeditiously and in the nation’s interest in times of crisis or adjudicate legitimate 
differences in times of peace, we were surprised by the degree of antagonism that seems 
to characterize the relationship at present.    
 
Many in Congress see problems in the current relationship.  As one veteran 
committee staff director put it, “It [the state of relations between senior DoD officials and 
their overseers in Congress] is worse than I have ever seen in my twenty-plus years on 
the Hill.”  Another high-ranking staff member expressed “surprise that the Secretary and 
Deputy have allowed the relationship to deteriorate as far as it has. …”   Many factors, 
we believe, have contributed to this state of affairs.   
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Many members of Congress and their staffs believe that many senior civilian and 
military leaders in the Departments view Congress with arrogance and disdain.  Several 
interviewees noted that this is not a new phenomenon, nor is it unique to the current 
administration.  Indeed, for decades administrations of both parties have expressed 
reluctance and frustration in their dealings with the Congress.  Today, however, the 
situation appears exacerbated. 
 
Most Congressional interviewees believe there is an inadequate flow of 
information from DoD to the Hill.  More than one committee chairman complained of 
learning of major policy, budget, programmatic, and operational details and 
developments through the news media.  One interviewee asserted that “we [the chairmen 
and ranking minority members of the principal oversight committees] should never, ever 
be surprised” by major actions or announcements of the Department.  Yet, according to 
many on Capitol Hill, committee leaders constantly have to fight for information from the 
Department or learn about major decisions through CNN or some other news media 
outlet.   
 
There was also the perception that it was difficult to identify a single individual 
who has the Secretary’s ear and is capable of speaking for him or her on matters of 
importance to the Congress as it carries out its legitimate oversight and legislative 
functions.   Several interviewees expressed frustration at the lack of clear lines of 
authority within the Department for formulating a position on pending legislation and 
providing such information to the defense committees in a timely manner.   
 
Concern was also expressed about the apparent refusal of senior DoD officials to 
work behind-the-scenes with the committee chairmen and other members and staff 
regarding the substance of legislation under consideration within the Department or the 
appropriate strategy for securing passage of key Departmental legislative initiatives.  The 
recent example of legislation authorizing modifications to the civilian personnel system 
was cited in this regard.  According to one committee professional staff member, senior 
DoD officials refused to work with that committee’s leadership on either the substance of 
or the legislative strategy associated with that legislation before the measure was formally 
submitted to the Congress for its consideration; as a result, the Department “got less [of 
what it had requested] and ruffled more feathers than necessary.” 
 
In all, this suggests a perceived lack of trust and respect for the views of members 
of Congress by some senior DoD officials. 
   
For their part, senior DoD officials expressed many frustrations in their dealings 
with the Legislative branch.  In addition to complaining about many of the features of 
legislative control listed above, defense officials frequently lambaste Congressional 
“micromanagement” of defense programs, policies, and processes.  For example, 
Secretary Rumsfeld argued in an interview that many state governors have greater 
authority to reprogram funds from one activity to another than he does as Secretary of a 
department with a $400 billion annual budget.   The BG-N study team believes that 
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Congress should provide the Secretary of Defense with more management flexibility, but 
that is unlikely to occur unless a new relationship based upon respect, reciprocity and 
transparency can be built.  
 
Recommendations 
 
• Seek a bipartisan, “BRAC-like” process for reinvigorating Congressional 
oversight of DoD. 
 
Congress must reform itself.  Any actions must be initiated and embraced by 
Congress, because each House of Congress can always change its rules at the beginning 
of each session.  The BG-N study team believes that Congressional oversight would be 
strengthened if the Armed Services committees were encouraged to focus on “macro” 
strategy, policy and organizational issues.  We also believe that it is critical to cut the size 
of the authorizing committees and limit claims of jurisdiction from other committees.  
Perhaps, it is time to experiment (again) with a two-year authorization bill.  We make 
these as suggestions, not recommendations, because only Congress can develop a process 
of self-reform. 
 
To address Congressional reform, Congress may need to establish a process 
similar to the one created for the base realignment and closure (BRAC).  Congress could 
establish an independent group (perhaps of former Congressional leaders from both 
Houses and both parties) to assess current committee membership, structures and 
jurisdictions and to make recommendations on how to enhance Congressional oversight.  
This commission would then make a set of proposals to the bipartisan Congressional 
leadership for acceptance or rejection as a package deal. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Is it possible for the Congress to focus on broader topics?  Is there a model for 
how the defense oversight committees might follow to regain lost clout and competence 
on truly national issues?   
 
In fact, on numerous occasions over the past twenty years the authorizing 
committees have risen to the challenge and waged a serious dialogue and debate on issues 
of national importance.  Examples of such leadership include: the series of hearings in the 
early 1980s in the SASC, led by Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner, on NATO defense 
strategy; the hearings held by the SASC and the HASC during November and December 
of 1991 that helped prepare the nation for the first Gulf war; the review of DoD force 
structure and strategy options in the HASC under Chairman Les Aspin in 1992; the 
reports on declining military readiness issued by HASC Ranking Minority Member Floyd 
Spence in the mid 1990s; and most important of all, the dialogue and debate over how to 
promote more effective joint warfighting capabilities, led by Senator Barry Goldwater 
and Congressman Bill Nichols, that culminated in the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 
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Strengthening Congressional oversight over DoD is not a “zero-sum” game in 
which DoD loses power to the Congress or vice versa.  Stronger Congressional oversight 
will lead to more debates over defense issues and stronger defense strategies and policies.  
Indeed, the real and most important beneficiary would be the American people who 
rightly expect their elected representatives and appointed leaders to work together to 
protect them from ever more complicated threats and challenges.  We hope the ideas and 
concerns outlined in this section will help stimulate the kind of renewed emphasis on 
effective Congressional oversight the American people expect and deserve.     
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Chapter 10 
BG-N Phase 1 Recommendations 
 
This chapter lists all of the Phase 1 Report’s major recommendations, categorized 
according to the authority and potential resources that are required for their 
implementation.  The President, the Secretary of Defense, or the head of an Executive 
Branch department or agency, as appropriate, can implement those in the first group.  The 
second group of recommendations requires amendments to Title 5 or Title 10 of the 
United States Code.  Implementation of the third group of recommendations requires 
additional budgetary resources provided by Congress.  
 
Ch. Major Recommendation Executive 
Authority 
Changes to 
USC Title 5 or 
Title 10 
Budgetary 
Resources 
4 Eliminate or consolidate much 
of the Service Secretariats into 
the Service Staffs. 
 √  
4 Combine elements of J-1 and 
the relevant parts of OSD 
(P&R) under a military deputy 
to the Under Secretary (P&R). 
√   
4 Move the Joint Logistics 
Operation Center to J-3 (where 
it is already co-located); 
combine the remainder with 
DUSD (Logistics & Material 
Readiness) under a 3-star 
deputy to the Under Secretary 
(AT&L). 
√   
4/6 Convert (or transform) J-6 into 
new Joint Task Force for Joint 
C2 (with budgetary and 
acquisition authority), 
incorporating appropriate 
elements of DISA.   
√  √ 
4 Disband J-7 and transfer 
responsibilities to the J-3, J-5, 
J-8 and the Joint Forces 
Command. 
√   
4 Expand the Under Secretary of 
Intelligence to include C3.  
 √  
4 Consolidate OSD housekeeping 
functions under an ASD for 
Administration. 
√   
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Ch. Major Recommendation Executive 
Authority 
Changes to 
USC Title 5 or 
Title 10 
Budgetary 
Resources 
5 Build J-8 capacities in the 
Combatant Commands. 
√   
5 Build a stronger PA&E. √   
5 Create an Office of 
Implementation & Execution 
Review. 
√   
7 Establish a new Defense 
Professionals Corps. 
 √ √ 
7 Create headroom for 
professional development for 
GS-12 through career-SES by 
either reducing the number of 
billets while maintaining 
current personnel levels or 
increasing endstrength – 1,000 
additional billets – or a 
combination thereof. 
√  √ 
7 Require an interagency rotation 
to be eligible for career SES 
appointment in any national 
security agency. 
√   
7 Create additional opportunities 
for professional advancement.    
√   
8 Designate a Deputy Assistant to 
the President on the NSC as 
having lead responsibility for 
integrating agency plans and 
ensuring greater unity of effort 
among agencies during 
execution; establish a new NSC 
office with this mandate. 
√   
8 Issue Presidential guidance 
establishing standard operating 
procedures for the planning of 
complex contingency 
operations. 
√   
8 Establish new planning offices 
in the Departments of State, 
Treasury, Commerce and 
Justice.   
√   
8 Designate one senior official to 
be in charge of and accountable 
for integrating U.S. interagency 
√   
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Ch. Major Recommendation Executive 
Authority 
Changes to 
USC Title 5 or 
Title 10 
Budgetary 
Resources 
operations on the ground. 
8 Establish a new Agency for 
Stability Operations, with a 
Civilian Stability Operations 
Corps and Reserve. 
√ √ √ 
8 Create a new Training Center 
for Interagency and Coalition 
Operations. 
√  √ 
8 Increase U.S. funding for 
programs that support building 
the operational capabilities of 
allies and partners. 
√  √ 
8 Enhance peacetime 
opportunities for civilian 
planners and operators to work 
with their counterparts from 
various countries. 
√  √ 
9 Initiate BRAC-like bipartisan 
process to consolidate and 
reshape Congressional 
committee oversight of DoD.48 
   
 
The BG-N study team notes, in conclusion, that some of its recommendations will 
save money, while others call for more expenditure.  We have not tried to “balance the 
books” among our recommendations, as any financial implications will largely depend on 
the details of an implementation plan.  Our recommendations are designed to enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Defense Department and key parts of the national 
security apparatus.  We therefore consider the provision of additional resources, where 
necessary, to be investments, not costs, in first-order national priorities.   
                                                 
48 We envision a legislated BRAC-like process with respect to our proposals for strengthening 
Congressional oversight, but in reality Congress can change the law by adopting rules for its own 
procedures.   
Beyond Goldwater-Nichols:  Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
78
Chapter 11 
BG-N Phase 2 Agenda 
 
 Our Phase 2 agenda of issues has evolved out of our Phase 1 work.  The vetting 
process was particularly useful in this regard, because many of the former senior officials 
expressed broad support for the Phase 1 recommendations but identified additional issues 
that CSIS should address during Phase 2.  CSIS currently plans to address the following 
issues during Phase 2: 
 
Organizing for new missions and new domains of warfare. 
• DoD has been adapting in the face of changing mission requirements and the 
evolution of warfare, but probably has not gone far enough. 
o For example, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) stood up before the 
Department of Homeland Security was created. 
• At a minimum, the BG-N study team will look at how DoD is organized for 
homeland defense, counterterrorism and stability operations, as well as space and 
cyberspace. 
  
Building on the Phase 1 interagency work. 
• The most common reaction we received to our BG-N Phase 1 recommendations 
to improve the planning and conduct of interagency operations was:  “Good 
recommendations, but you need to do more.”  
• In Phase 2, the BG-N study team will address this issue from a more strategic 
perspective and will attempt to provide, as one stakeholder requested, “A 
Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency.”  
 
The defense acquisition process. 
• Despite repeated efforts at acquisition reform, weapons procurement is still too 
slow and costly. 
• The Program Executive Officer (PEO) structure set up by Goldwater Nichols 
must be revisited. 
 
Unified Command Plan (UCP) issues. 
• Will the role of regional Combatant Commanders change in an era of global force 
management? 
 
Organization and staffing of Joint Task Force Headquarters below the four-star 
Combatant Commander. 
• There are more than 35 Joint Task Forces deployed worldwide, many with 60-70 
percent manning.  Goldwater-Nichols never envisioned this.  
 
The defense agencies. 
• A zero-based assessment of the defense agencies, now responsible for about a 
fifth of the DoD budget, is long overdue. 
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Implementation of Goldwater-Nichols’ provisions on the joint officer management and 
joint professional military education (JPME) systems. 
• Congress remains highly interested in these issues. 
 
The BG-N Phase 2 effort will  begin on April 1, 2004 and last 12 months.  
CSIS plans to publish the Phase 2 report in mid-February 2005.  In a parallel, but closely 
related effort, CSIS also plans to examine Total Force and All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
issues.  The current pace of military operations, particularly in Iraq, is straining the Total 
Force and raises substantial concerns about the long-term sustainability of both the Total 
Force and AVF. 
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Appendix 2 
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Appendix 3 
Organizational Charts 
 
Figure 1 
Organizational Structure of the Department of Air Force 
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Figure 2  
Organizational Structure of the Department of Navy 
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Figure 3 
Organizational Structure of the Department of Army 
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Figure 4 
Recommended Military Department Organization 
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Figure 5 
Current Joint Staff Organization 
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Figure 6 
Recommended Joint Staff Organization 
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Figure 7 
Current OSD Organizational Structure 
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Figure 8 
Recommended OSD Structure 
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List of Chart Abbreviations 
 
ADR&C Assessments, Doctrine, Requirements and Capabilities 
AG  Auditor General  
AS  Assistant Secretary 
ASA  Assistant Secretary of the Army 
ASAF  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
ASN   Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
AT&L  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
ACSIM Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management  
ALT  Acquisition, Logistics & Technology 
AR  Army Reserve 
AV  Aviation 
C  Comptroller 
CD  Combat Developments 
CH  Chaplain 
CIFA  Counterintelligence Field Activity 
CIO   Chief Information Officer  
CJCS  Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CMC  Commandant Marine Corps  
CNO  Chief of Naval Operations  
CW  Civil Works 
C4  Command, Control, Communications, and Computers  
DAS  Director Army Staff 
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency 
DCAA  Defense Contract Audit Agency 
DCS  Deputy Chief of Staff  
DFAS  Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
DUSA  Deputy Under Secretary of the Army 
FM  Force Management 
FM&C  Financial Management & Comptroller  
HA  Health Affairs 
HD  Homeland Defense 
HS  Health Services  
I  Intelligence 
IA  International Affairs  
I, E&L  Installations, Environment & Logistics  
IG  Inspector General  
I&L  Installations & Logistics  
INT  Intelligence 
ISA  International Security Affairs 
ISP  International Security Policy 
IT  Information Technologies 
JAG  Judge Advocate General  
JMMD  Joint Manpower Management Division 
JSS  Joint Staff Support 
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JWCA  Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment 
LL  Legislative Liaison  
LMR  Logistics Materiel Readiness 
LOG  Logistics 
M&RA Manpower & Reserve Affairs  
MDA  Missile Defense Agency 
NA  Net Assessments 
NCB  Nuclear, Chemical, Biological  
NGIA  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
NGB  National Guard Bureau  
NII  Networks Information Integration 
NP  Nuclear Propulsion  
NSA  National Security Agency 
P  Policy 
PA  Public Affairs 
PA&E  Program Analysis & Evaluation 
Pers  Personnel  
POL SPT Policy Support 
P&P  Plans & Policy  
PP&O  Plans, Policy & Operations  
R&E  Research & Engineering 
PI  Program Integration 
PR  Programs & Resources 
P&R  Personnel & Readiness 
PRD  Personnel Readiness Division 
PSD  Personnel Services Division 
OFT  Office Force Transformation 
OR  Operations Research 
OT&E  Operational Test & Evaluation 
RA  Reserve Affairs 
RDA  Research, Development & Acquisition  
READ  Readiness 
REQ  Requirements 
SADBU Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization  
SAF  Safety  
SG  Staff Group 
SMA  Sergeant Major of the Army 
SOLIC  Special Operations & Low-Intensity Conflict 
USD  Under Secretary of Defense  
 
